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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The year 2009 marked an interesting time for insurgencies. Many Americans had 
grown tired of the word, which appeared frequently in news broadcasts about Iraq. In 
February, President Obama announced his plan to remove most American troops from the 
battlegrounds of Iraq, signaling an end to one of the most controversial conflicts in the 
country’s history. This conflict, which resulted in “tens of thousands of civilian deaths,”1 had 
been prolonged by the Iraqi insurgency. As American troops depart, the Iraqi state continues 
to face the threat posed by this force. 
Across the globe, Sri Lankans wearily celebrated the end of a decades-long 
nightmare. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, was defeated in May of 2009. 
Conflict between this insurgency and the state, based upon ethnic differences, claimed over 
90,000 lives2 and sparked an immense exodus from Sri Lanka, particularly of ethnic Tamils. 
Even now many families have been unable to return to Sri Lanka, while those living within 
face continued problems with infrastructure resulting from a lack or development during the 
war. 
These two strikingly different examples illustrate that insurgencies are a significant 
global phenomenon. They have shaped the way conflict is considered today, but a number of 
puzzles about their existence, capabilities, and successes remain. This thesis tackles one such 
puzzle. 
                                                
1 Baker, Peter, “With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout,” The New York Times, February 27, 
2009. Accessed April 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/washington/28troops.html 
2 M.R. Narayan Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s story, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2010), 
186. 
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INSURGENCIES: AN IMPORTANT ACADEMIC AND POLICYMAKING PUZZLE 
The study of violent non-state groups, including guerillas, rebel armies, terrorist 
groups, and insurgencies is critically important for both policymakers and academics. The 
frequency of internal conflicts has now eclipsed traditional wars between great powers, with 
29 intrastate wars and no interstate conflicts occurring in 2009.3 Though usually lower in 
intensity (i.e., causing fewer total deaths) than interstate wars, intrastate conflicts have grave 
consequences for civilian populations, state development, and diplomacy. Insurgent armies 
and the states combatting them are frequently condemned for grave human rights violations, 
ranging from kidnapping and murder of civilians to the use of child soldiers.4 And 
insurgency-driven conflicts are among some of the longest lasting. For example, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has threatened Colombian society 47 
years, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was decimated in 2009 only after 
34 years of unrest. The prevalence of insurgency-state conflicts in the last 50 years and the 
scope of destruction and chaos resulting from them make it essential to produce policy 
recommendations and bring them to an end. At the most basic level, this pursuit should be 
undertaken to limit the grave consequences for civilian populations. 
The number of these conflicts and the diversity of circumstances in which they occur 
have generated a vast amount of literature seeking to explain their origin, longevity, the 
motivations of the combatants, and their termination. The characteristics that make 
insurgencies interesting are precisely what make them difficult to explain. They are not 
                                                
3 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, April 7, 2011, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ 
4 An extreme example of an insurgency condemned for violating human rights is the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda, the leaders of which remain at large despite International Criminal Court arrest warrants for acts such 
as murder of civilians, forced sexual enslavement and forced recruitment of children. 
“Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders,” International Criminal Court, last modified 
October 13, 2005, accessed April 7, 2011. 
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limited to a specific geographical area, continent, or type of state. They can be fueled by 
ethnic or religious tension, political ideology, or greed. They differ in number of supporters, 
how the insurgents fight the state, or their rate of success. Due to these almost infinite 
variations, any findings are unlikely to be universally applicable. Significant numbers of 
research programs and individual studies have emerged to explain each aspect of 
insurgencies.  
This thesis examines one possible explanation for why some insurgencies succeed, 
while others fail. In particular, I examine the role played by third-party material support in 
increasing insurgency capabilities. External assistance—from money and arms to the 
provision of safe haven, intelligence, diplomatic aid, and training—is an under-studied 
phenomenon despite its importance both within the state involved and for international 
actors. 
 
EXTERNAL AID: CATALOGUING WHO AND HOW 
 Twenty years ago, policies regarding external assistance to insurgencies were entirely 
different as states were generally the sole providers of material aid that had the potential to 
affect the results of an intrastate conflict. While states continue to intervene on behalf of 
insurgencies, the Cold-War era assumption that they are the only actors to do so is now 
obsolete. Diasporas, other insurgencies or violent groups, international criminal 
organizations, such as the drug or arms trades, and NGOs are now all recognized as possible 
sources of material support. The widening range of providers requires further analysis before 
their effect upon insurgency-state conflicts themselves can be understood. The need for 
 7 
policy innovation to combat global terrorism has recently motivated increased awareness of 
previously unconsidered actors. 
The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ have generated 
fresh interest in the global implications of non-state violence. This has led to new research on 
cooperation among terrorist groups but not on how terrorist organizations might aid 
insurgencies in based in other states, and certainly not on other connections insurgencies 
might seek. For example, the FARC is believed to have cooperated with the Basque terrorist 
group ETA.  This odd alliance received considerable coverage by international news sources. 
However, the media took an interest mainly in whether their collaboration magnified the 
international terrorist threat, rather than whether FARC benefited.5 As this example suggests, 
external support for insurgencies from non-state actors occurs, may be important, and 
deserves closer study. 
 
DIFFERENT ACTORS, DIFFERENT EFFECTS: AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION 
There are a few analyses of how external support might strengthen insurgencies—but 
relatively little research on the implication of receiving assistance from non-state actors.6  
Yet, receipt of material aid from states has been shown to alter the course of an insurgency in 
a variety of significant ways.  As Daniel Byman and his co-authors state: “Both state and 
non-state support for an insurgency can make a movement far more effective, prolong the 
                                                
5 More specifically, the main concern was that Venezuela had facilitated the connection between the two 
groups, which suggests that even in the case of two violent organizations collaborating, state involvement 
continues to capture the attention of the international community. For examples of articles:   
Andres Cala, “Spanish Judge Accuses Venezuela of Aiding Basque and Colombian Militants,” The New York 
Times. March 2, 2010, accessed August 2010. 
Juan Forero, “Venezuela's Hugo Chavez allegedly helped Colombian, Spanish militants forge ties,” The 
Washington Post, March 2 2010, accessed August 2010. 
6 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside 
Support for Insurgent Movements, (Santa Monica: RAND Publishers, 2001), 4.  The authors assert that only a 
“scant” amount attention has been paid to external support in recent years. 
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war, increase the scale and lethality of its struggle, and may even transform a civil conflict 
into an international war…the effects can be both positive and negative, they are also often 
unpredictable.”7   
The need to understand the relationship between material aid from non-state actors 
and insurgency capabilities motivates my thesis. I contribute to the understanding of external 
support by taking a different approach to the puzzle of material support. This thesis will 
bridge the gap of understanding between the source of support and how the insurgency’s 
capabilities increase as a result of each provider’s involvement. Based on the conclusions of 
my hypotheses, policymakers should be able to better understand whether and why 
insurgencies benefit from certain types of external aid, potentially pursuing better 
counterinsurgency policies. With further study, perhaps the consequences of non-state aid 
need not be perceived as entirely ‘unpredictable.’ 
 This thesis studies how different providers of material aid, in particular, the narcotics 
trade, other violent groups, and diasporas, affect insurgency capabilities. I generate three 
hypotheses about the effects of material aid provided by each source. First, I suggest that 
involvement with the drug trade gives an insurgency the capacity to expand its entire scope. 
Second, I propose that diaspora support amplifies the insurgency’s ability to confront the 
state and facilitates an increase in popular support. My final hypothesis states that support 
from another violent, non-state group will provide the insurgency with new tactics or 
technologies.  
 These hypotheses are tested on two case studies: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Ultimately, I find that 
the FARC experienced widespread growth by tapping into narcotics income, and they later 
                                                
7 Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 3. 
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boosted their tactics and were able to engage in urban terrorism as a result of training 
provided by a third party. In the case of the LTTE, their access to funding from the Tamil 
diaspora increased their capacity to confront rather than just evade the state, while the 
diaspora’s aid in disseminating pro-LTTE propaganda—both directly to the Tamil 
community and to the governments of their host states—helped them to create an 
international support structure.  My analysis of these case studies produces opportunities for 
future research and new suggestions for policy direction based on the overall conclusion that 
different non-state providers of material aid do influence an insurgency by expanding its 
capabilities in different ways. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 This thesis has four additional chapters. The next chapter reviews the literature on 
insurgencies.  It 1) defines important terms, 2) analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the 
extant literature, and 3) presents alternative hypotheses for insurgency success. In this 
chapter, I also present my three hypotheses for how cooperation with the narcotics trade, 
another violent group, and diasporas affect insurgency capabilities and outline the 
methodology I use to test them. The third chapter presents my first case study, the FARC, 
analyzing the effects of the insurgency’s participation in the narcotics trade and their 
cooperation with the Irish Republican Army, a terrorist group based in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland. I argue that these two interactions affected the insurgency in different ways, 
manifesting themselves as 1) a vast increase in scope and 2) participation in a new type of 
violent resistance via urban terrorism, respectively. The fourth chapter analyzes the whether 
diaspora aid strengthened the Sri Lankan LTTE, finding that cultivating a strong connection 
 10 
with the diaspora provided indispensable funding in addition to positive representation in key 
Western states. The final chapter summarizes my results and offers suggestions for 
policymaking and future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY CHAPTER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The problem of insurgency-state conflict is hardly a new one, as insurgencies across 
the globe have been a threat since even before the creation of the modern state. But 
investigation of the factors leading to insurgency success or growth is constantly evolving, as 
this chapter’s literature review will suggest.  One developing factor is that of external 
support, that is, material or diplomatic assistance originating outside of the insurgency’s 
home state. With current trends in globalization and technology, external support may 
increasingly affect the outcome of insurgency-state conflict. The literature sparingly 
examines this interaction of support and insurgencies, but requires more focused study. My 
research on material aid provided by a non-state source helps to fill this need.  
 This chapter has seven sections.  First, I present my definition of insurgency. Second, 
I review the existing literature on the conditions that enable insurgencies to achieve their 
objectives, noting that material support is viewed as necessary for success but is 
understudied. In particular, I argue that mere acknowledgement that non-state actors can 
provide material support is insufficient, and that further study is needed to understand how 
their involvement affects insurgency capabilities. Finally, I present three hypotheses on how 
different non-state actors, specifically the narcotics trade, another violent group, and a 
diaspora increase an insurgency’s ability to meet its goals. 
 
 
 12 
WHY ‘INSURGENCY’? 
 The literature uses several terms to describe domestic opposition movements such as 
violent non-state actors, non-state armed groups, terrorists, and guerrillas, among others.8 
This research, however, examines insurgencies. Insurgencies exhibit several characteristics.   
First, each has a shared group identity, which is used to recruit active members and maintain 
wider popular support.9  Second, unlike terrorist groups or guerilla armies, insurgencies use a 
wide range of tactics to achieve their goals, from presenting and disseminating propaganda to 
engaging in terrorism.10  Finally, insurgencies have political goals directed mainly against the 
                                                
8 Klejda Mulaj, introduction to Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, ed. Klejda Mulaj. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 3-4.  and Belgin San Acka, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort 
to Illegality?" Journal of Strategic Studies 32., no. 4, (2009): 590. The desire to better understand and evaluate 
the behavior of non-state violence has led to the coining of multiple terms to define the actors. The broadest of 
these designations is likely that of VNSA or ‘Violent Non-State Actors.’ Klejda Mulaj includes liberation 
movements, guerilla insurgents, terrorists, militants, and even mercenary militias within this designation, 
recognizing that overlap in strategies and goals is likely to occur. Similar to this acronym, ‘NAG’ or Non-state 
Armed Group can also be broadly applicable. For Belgin San Acka, a NAG is any organized group which 
resorts to violence, has a political goal (rather than random acts of violence), and does not utilize state forces. 
Although these two distinctions are both applicable to this research, I have found them unnecessarily wide-
ranging. Literature making use of these acronyms is still useful, however, as the type of group this research will 
examine still falls within their scope. 
9 Lincoln B. Krause, "Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes," Parameters: US Army War College, 39, no. 
3, (2009):55. and Brian Reed, "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency," Parameters: US 
Army War College, 37, no.2 (2007): 24. For most authors, the identity of the insurgency forms the basis of their 
goals and actions. Brian Reed states that they have “pre-existing ties” through “religion, family or tribe that are 
adopted to fit insurgent warfare.” Although these are certainly three possible bases for group identity, they are 
not the only ones. The identity of an insurgency can shape where it seeks support (what other groups it reaches 
out to or what funding it seeks, for example) as well as how it chooses its actions. Krause discusses that 
decisions such as taking advantage of funding from criminal activities like drug smuggling can erode an 
insurgency’s basic identity and negatively affect the popular support and therefore momentum of the 
insurgency.  
10 Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 20; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, 97, no. 1 (2003): 75;  CIA. Guide to the 
Analysis of Insurgency.; Daniel Byman. “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 
31, no. 2 (2008): 170; Steven Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century 
Insurgency," Parameters: U.S. Army War College 37, no. 4 (2007): 25; Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, 
Introduction to The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003), 2; 
Brendan O’Leary and John Tirman, Introduction to Terror, Insurgency and the State, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 7. Byman, Fearon and Laitin link guerilla warfare and insurgency, stating that 
these ‘small, lightly armed bands’ work from rural areas. Mulaj uses Fearon and Laitin’s definition, but later 
notes that the environments created by the states each group opposes leads to a wide variety of tactics. As such, 
the CIA definition in its Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency says, “Insurgent activity- including guerilla 
warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party 
organization, and international activity- is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while 
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central government. They aim to change the policies of a government or the regime itself.11 
Many authors link this to controlling territory within the state.12   
 
A FOCUS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY 
 Much of the literature focuses on how to defeat insurgencies. It primarily discusses 
either successful counterinsurgency campaigns or failed insurgencies, highlighting their 
inability to organize, find adequate funding, or generate a supportive domestic environment. 
Although this research emphasizes that each case is unique, scholars agree upon several 
counterinsurgency strategies that tend to increase a government’s chances of quashing these 
groups. For example, states should provide outlets such as valid elections or referendums and 
an accessible process of decision making so that minority groups can express their grievances 
against the state. In addition, governments should improve services to rural and urban 
communities so that insurgents cannot fill that void and gain popular support.13 That said, 
these basic policies are best suited to combating weak insurgencies, as opposed to those able 
                                                                                                                                                  
increasing insurgency control and legitimacy.” Metz notes the increased use of terrorism in insurgencies 
operating in the 21st century. Ballentine and Sherman state that insurgencies also engage in various forms of 
self-financing, sometimes becoming a factor in the local economy. Finally, O’Leary and Tirman discuss the use 
of violence specifically against civilians as a strategy typical to insurgencies. 
11 Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” 24. 
12 Daniel Byman. “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 170; Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support to 
Insurgent Movements. The CIA pamphlet is also referenced on this subject: “Insurgency is a protracted-political 
military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of 
irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.” 
13 Byman, and others, Trends In Outside Support to Insurgent Movements; Krause, “Playing for the Breaks, 
Insurgent Mistakes”; Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency"; 
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency 
Wars," International Organization 63 no. 1 (2009); Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 22; 
Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (2006): 9-11.; William Rosenau, 
"Counterinsurgency," Harvard International Review, 31, no. 1 (2009). Metz discusses the need for different 
counterinsurgency strategies and a flexibility for understanding the insurgency. Mulaj takes this analysis a step 
further in saying that counterinsurgencies should be keen not to alienate the local population. Sepp forms a list 
of successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts, based upon roughly 50 insurgencies from around the 
world. Many authors, such as Rosenau, are reformulating their counterinsurgency discussions to reflect modern 
‘COIN’ operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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to present themselves to marginalized groups as a political or economic alternative or can 
compete militarily with the state.14  
 Because the literature focuses on counterinsurgency strategy, less is known about the 
conditions that enable insurgencies to succeed, by which I mean to force a compromise with 
the state or eliminate the state as a rival entirely. There are, however, some implicit 
arguments in the extant research.15  
 Insurgencies are more likely to make inroads against the government if they can: (1) 
maintain an organizational structure, (2) market and promote their goals, not just their ethnic, 
religious, or ideological identity, (3) connect to the domestic populace, frequently by 
providing services, (4) gain some kind of territory or base, and (5) gain support, which ranges 
from domestic tolerance of the insurgency’s activities to material aid provided by external 
actors. I will discuss each in turn.  
 First, an insurgency can make gains if it has a tightly monitored and cohesive 
organization, capable of efficiently controlling its supporters and fighters.16 A successful 
insurgency must be able to coordinate various actions of the group such as military efforts 
and the spread of propaganda. Second, a successful insurgency must have a cause or unifying 
goal to which individuals or supporting entities can attach themselves. Daniel Byman and his 
co-authors view this as critical, stressing that a successful insurgency can present a politically 
                                                
14 Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” 23. More specific strategies suggested 
in the literature to combat actions taken by insurgents are typically found in studies of U.S. counterinsurgency 
methods in the global War on Terror. For example, although Reed’s article provides a different and engaging 
way to study these groups’ external connections, his 21st century examples encompass “Iraq and others” of a 
similar mold. Precise counterinsurgency literature that addresses insurgencies other than those the United States 
is working against is more difficult to encounter.   
15 Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 181. Some of the literature focuses on how insurgencies begin, 
rather than their success once established. In Byman’s article, he explicitly gives five steps proto-insurgencies 
must take to mature into full insurgent movements: create a “politically relevant identity,” join the identity to a 
cause that has enough appeal, deal with rivals, find a sanctuary (territory), and address the need for external 
support.  
16 Robert Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters: US Army War College, 34, no. 1, 
(2004): 19. 
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salient goal against the state, which implies that the goal is both reasonable and important to 
others.17  Third, successful insurgents may provide services to civilians to widen their 
support base.18 Fourth, if an insurgency can establish territorial holdings, they can increase 
their ability to wage war against the state and their visible presence.19 Finally, no insurgency 
can succeed without support.20 
The concept of ‘support’ is vaguely defined in the literature. Some authors interpret 
support as domestic ideological backing, signifying tacit agreement with the insurgency’s 
goals or connection with their identity, while others mean international material aid. The 
literature does not identify which type of support is most important, nor does it fully explain 
how the provision of support allows the insurgency to make gains. The question of whether 
and how domestic and international support for insurgencies enables these movements to 
grow and increase their legitimacy relative to the state remains inadequately answered. The 
state of this literature is further discussed in the next section. 
 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SUPPORT? 
 The existing literature on support for insurgencies is divided into two groups. First, 
some scholars focus on how supporters fulfill the material and political needs of 
insurgencies. Material needs are those limiting the combative capacity of the insurgency, 
while political needs limit the perception of the insurgency as legitimate. Byman, Chalk, 
Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan’s book Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 
                                                
17 Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support to Insurgent Movements, 89. 
18 John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and The End of Globalization, (Hoboken: John 
Wiley & Sons Inc, 2007). 
19 Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 20, and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca,  and Luis de la Calle, 
“Domestic Terrorism: the Hidden Side of Political Violence,” Annual Review of Political Science, 12, (2009). 
20 Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 18. 
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for example, suggests that third parties provide crucial support in the form of safe haven or 
transit, financial assistance, political support and propaganda, and direct military support.21 
Paul similarly argues that they provide for the needs of insurgents, such as manpower, 
funding, materiel, intelligence, sanctuary, and ‘tolerance of activity,’ which includes a refusal 
to actively aide the state or allowing the insurgency to operate on their territory.22  
 The second category of literature seeks to identify the main sources of support for 
insurgencies, focusing upon states but making mention of non-state providers. Historically, 
only states were viewed as able to step into this role.23 For example, during the Cold War, the 
United States and the Soviet Union supported insurgencies as a means to create future allies 
and disseminate their political ideologies.  Surprisingly, non-state providers of external 
support, namely diasporas, other insurgencies or violent groups, NGOs, and actors engaging 
in international crime such as the arms or drug trade have been largely neglected in the 
analysis of success.  
Through these two methods, most scholars argue that some form of support—either 
domestic or international—is necessary for an insurgency’s survival and crucial for even 
marginal gains. However, as Christopher Paul notes in his article on why individuals or 
organizations support an insurgency or terrorist group: “Where support for terrorism is 
addressed in the existing literature, the focus is typically limited to state support, financial 
support, or expressions of support as captured in public opinion polls. More often, support is 
                                                
21 Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support to Insurgent Movements. 
22 Christopher Paul, “As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships between Factors  
Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33, (2010): 491. 
For both Paul and Byman et al, material needs are clearly important: insurgencies must have a safe haven from 
which to operate, must be able to fund their activities, and need manpower to accomplish any military actions. 
However, intelligence support is not viewed as ‘crucial’ by Byman, et al, while Paul does not place as much 
importance upon the spread of propaganda. 
23 Record, Jeffrey. "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success." Parameters: US Army War College 36, 
no. 3 (2006). 
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simply assumed as authors address other questions.”24 As a result, there is the sense that 
support is central to success but little consensus on what type of support, from what actors, 
and at what level, is most important and why. Further, material support from a third party is 
mentioned as a possible catalyst for achievement, but the literature does not identify the 
process through which an insurgency converts this aid into a defeat of the state.  
Diasporas, NGOs, and illegal dealings are mentioned in the literature, but their ability 
to provide support is assumed to be limited, restricted largely to financial support or indirect 
support such as propaganda.25 These activities are seen as incidental to an insurgency’s 
strategy, rather than a driving factor behind an insurgency’s growth or increasing 
achievements. It is assumed that more substantive forms of support such as provision of safe 
haven, intelligence, or training are provided by a neighboring state.26 Where mention of non-
state support occurs, it is incomprehensive and fails to cover all possible non-state providers. 
Additionally, the literature does not explain the connection between an application of non-
state aid and the resulting increase in capacity or capabilities to the extent that state support is 
examined.  Finally, the possibility that specific capability increases may correspond to the 
involvement of different non-state sources is not acknowledged. 
These oversights are problematic as support from states has waned following the Cold 
War and non-state actors are increasingly playing a role in these conflicts. Indeed, in the 
most recent counterinsurgency literature, scholars suggest that insurgencies should no longer 
rely only upon state assistance. As Lincoln Krause observes: “If an insurgent movement fails 
                                                
24 Paul, “As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or 
Insurgent Groups,” 489. 
25 Byman and others, Trends in Support for Insurgent Movements and Reed, “A Social Network Approach to 
Understanding an Insurgency.” 
26 Idean Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups,” World Politic,. 
59, no. 2, (2007). 
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to diversify its sources of support—for example, by drawing on diasporas, other non-state 
groups, and indigenous sources—it may become vulnerable to any rapid withdrawal of state 
support.”27 Consequently, a successful one will seek support from a wider range of actors. 
An exception to the overall state of the literature is the aforementioned text presented 
by Daniel Byman and his coauthors. In this book, the authors discuss both state support and 
assistance from non-state sources such as refugees and diasporas. However, even in this 
exceptional research, greater attention is given to the motivations of different supporting 
actors and the types of aid given, rather than how insurgencies convert this support into 
greater capabilities. 
Although the literature tips its hat to the role played by these third parties, a thorough 
discussion of support by non-state actors such as foreign terrorist groups or insurgencies in 
particular is lacking. Regarding assistance from violent groups, there is some analysis of 
‘networks’ of insurgencies in the Middle East. This type of literature emerged following the 
U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing concern with isolating groups 
from other, like-minded actors that might share tactics or technology. But the possibility that 
other types of foreign non-state actors may provide support to other groups, even if political 
goals are dissimilar, is insufficiently explored.28 
 
WHAT IS MEANT BY ‘CAPABILITIES’ AND ‘SUCCESS’?   
   
 This research will assess the changes in an insurgency’s capabilities, as they influence 
the insurgency’s likelihood of complete or partial success. Specifically, three dimensions of 
                                                
27 Krause, "Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes," 53. 
28 Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.” 
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capabilities will be discussed: scope, tactics, and popular approval. An increase in scope 
implies increases in number of combatants, the amount of territory held, and military 
competency demonstrated by available weapons or the number of offensive attacks. 
Proliferation of tactics signifies the presence of a specific form of violent confrontation not 
previously possible for the insurgency, such as the development of urban terrorism. 
Amplified popular approval can be seen at both the international and domestic levels through 
greater tolerance of the insurgency. Tolerance encompasses inactive support such as other 
states’ unwillingness to condemn the insurgency or domestic communities’ acceptance of the 
group’s presence. Measurements of more active support, namely number of combatants, will 
be distinguished from popular approval and remain a component of scope. The analysis of 
these three dimensions should provide an accurate image of the development of an 
insurgency’s capability to oppose the state resulting from material aid. Any increase in each 
dimension implies an increase in capability, which negates the need to establish requirements 
for partial or complete success such as a specific amount of territory or number of troops 
gained. 
 I will examine insurgency capabilities because they exert a strong influence on the 
likelihood of success. The insurgency literature rarely defines success explicitly. Because 
most of the extant research is counterinsurgency-focused, for these studies ‘success’ means 
defeating the insurgency.29 However, insurgencies have goals for political change, such as 
controlling territory or replacing the government.  Thus, the most basic definition of success 
                                                
29 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency 
Wars," 71-72. A scale of success is present in Lyall and Wilson’s research, although they measure success from 
the state’s viewpoint.   In an armed conflict, a loss therefore means conceding entirely to the insurgency, a draw 
suggests compromise, and a win signifies that the state has not made any concessions to the insurgency and the 
insurgency is destroyed. This definition is useful for insurgencies actively engaged in guerilla warfare with the 
state when the viewpoint is reversed. However, this research will not use the terms ‘win, lose and draw’ as they 
suggest only the results of armed conflict without the inclusion of political influence or popular support.  
 20 
is whether the insurgency achieves its primary goal.  Restricting success to this high 
threshold implies that the insurgency is failing until it achieves all of its aims, which rarely 
occurs with actual insurgencies. While total success such as this is indeed possible, it should 
not be the only form of achievement recognized for an insurgency. 
 Success instead should be divided into ‘complete’ and ‘partial’ success. I define 
partial success as 1) any situation in which insurgency experiences notable growth despite 
state opposition or 2) the state is forced to compromise with the insurgency, whether through 
some loss of territory or political control. This success can occur off of the battlefield. 
Examining gains made by insurgencies only in armed clashes excludes dimensions such as 
increased legitimacy. As Mulaj states, the insurgencies’ goals are ultimately to achieve 
“political objectives and influence.”30 Achieving a political objective is simple enough to 
measure, but the scope of an insurgency’s influence may include varying factors such as its 
capabilities on the battlefield or its perception by external actors.  
 
HYPOTHESES ON ASSISTANCE FROM NON-STATE ACTORS 
 This research examines whether external support from non-state actors to 
insurgencies is a key factor leading to increased capabilities. The type of external sponsor 
varies, and we can expect that some types are more likely to improve the insurgency’s odds 
than others. Non-state providers of support include states, diasporas, narco-traffickers, and 
other insurgencies or NAGs.31  
In particular, I focus on the provision of material aid by non-state actors, including 
safe haven, funding, intelligence, materiel, technology, training, creation and dissemination 
                                                
30 Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 2. 
31 San Acka, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?" 590. 
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of propaganda, and/or soldiers. Although intelligence and training are difficult to perceive as 
‘materials,’ this support still represents a third party commitment to the political aims of the 
insurgency.  
Material support from non-state groups has several advantages. First, it is more 
difficult to monitor than state support, and as such, is easier to send and to receive without 
detection by the international community. Second, the conditions a state may place upon aid, 
such as economic or military alliances following insurgency success, are absent from non-
state aid. Finally, providers of this support need not be a neighboring entity, and as such this 
creates a wider network of support for the insurgency.  
 Naturally, each type of non-state benefactor may help an insurgency to counteract the 
state in different ways. One way for an insurgency to acquire external support, predominantly 
in the form of monetary compensation, is by participating in the narcotics trade.  Earnings 
from the cultivation, refinement, or trade of drugs provide support without conditions from 
the providers. These funds can then be tailored to advance and increase the numbers of active 
fighters or finance the occupation of more territory. The greater income could also 
supplement the purchase of more or more efficient weapons and increase the effectiveness of 
military operations against the state.  
 Participation in this illegal trade will not increase the positive perception of the 
insurgency resulting in greater popular approval. Groups accepting this involvement are 
clearly concerned with supplementing their capabilities on the battlefield and emerging as a 
counterpoint to the state forces opposing them. The primary way to do so is increase the 
number of individuals engaged in fighting, the amount of territory available for training, 
housing, and preparing attacks, and the availability of tools and weapons to increase attacks’ 
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effectiveness. This particular source of aid are unlikely to directly result in new tactics as the 
lack of training or conditions implies that the only possible application will be to augment the 
familiar approaches used by the insurgency. This trifold increase in scope provides 
sustainable channels for substantial, prolonged support, building both fighting capacity and 
the physical presence of the insurgency itself. 
H1:  Material support, such as increased income from narcotics trafficking, allows the 
insurgency to expand the scope of their operations, specifically through increased 
territory, combatants, or available weapons, thus becoming a better military 
counterpoint to the state. 
 
Another source of non-state external support are diasporas or communities living 
outside of their state of origin—most likely the one in which the insurgency is operating.32 
These groups, through their connection and commitment to the insurgency, provide the 
movement with financial assistance.  They may even organize business ventures for the 
explicit purpose of supplying an insurgency with monetary support. This support in particular 
is used, similar to support from the drug trade, to increase the capacity to combat the state. 
However, the diaspora’s provision of such funding is accompanied by the expectation of 
victories over the state. As such, while drug funding is used to increase the scope of the 
insurgency itself, diaspora funding can be expected to increase the scale and gravity of 
attacks against the state. The insurgency will most likely augment their fighting forces in 
similar ways to do so, but with less concern for sustaining the growth of the insurgency itself. 
                                                
32 Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 
Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 408. Sarah Wayland defines a diaspora in the context of insurgency 
support as “a type of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, whose members 
permanently reside in one or more ‘host’ countries and possess a collective, sometimes idealised, myth of the 
homeland and will to return.”   
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Support from a diaspora may allow the group to accumulate funding without being 
held accountable for how it is used to increase victories over the state. However, because the 
diaspora also has a strong interest in the trajectory and goals of the insurgency itself, the 
funding or support provided may be limited at times by their concerns or desires. Limitations 
imposed may affect the types of attacks used or targets, or conditions regarding the treatment 
of local populations. Additionally, some authors have examined the role of diasporas in both 
prolonging and terminating conflicts.33 This suggests that internationally condemned 
behavior such as violation of human rights may lead a diaspora to withhold funding in the 
hopes of reforming insurgency action. 
Finally, diasporas are crucial for generating public interest in the insurgency through 
propaganda or bringing attention to the movement’s plight in foreign channels of 
policymaking. This support can have an important effect upon the host states’ policies toward 
the insurgency, as well as its overall perception in both the host state and the diaspora’s state 
of origin. Yet another function of diasporas may be the provision of safe haven among the 
community for certain members of the insurgency itself. The possibility of safe haven 
provided by a diaspora may seem counterintuitive, but it is sometimes an option for the 
leadership or certain key members of an insurgency.  
H2:  Material support, especially financial backing, from diasporas allows the 
insurgency to increase the scale of their attacks against the state, although these 
attacks may be limited to certain sites, individuals, or tactics if the diaspora exercises 
such control. In addition, diaspora support via approval and dissemination of the 
group’s mission should lead to an increase in wider popular approval for the 
movement. 
 
                                                
33 Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and  
Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts, 11, (2005). 
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Lastly, insurgencies may receive training and support from other armed groups, 
namely a terrorist group or another insurgency, which can open new doors in an armed 
struggle. For example, communication with other violent groups may expand the range of 
tactics in the insurgency’s repertoire. This change in methods allows the insurgency to 
combat the state in new and unexpected ways, such as a rural guerilla group engaging in 
urban terrorism. Engaging with other combative groups may also lead to shared sources of 
and greater access to arms at the international level.  Particularly when an insurgency 
receives training for specific types of weapons previously unusable due to lack of familiarity, 
the trainer may advise the trainee in where to obtain these weapons, perhaps facilitating an 
exchange.  The adoption of tactics previously unavailable to the insurgency provides an 
opportunity to shock and draw attention, possibly resulting in concessions from the state. 
This increased attention may be generated by fear from civilian populations based on the new 
unpredictability of the insurgency’s actions. 
H3: Material support, specifically training, from other violent armed groups should 
allow the insurgency to employ new types of tactics, resulting in increased attention 
or concessions from the state. 
 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
 There are four alternative hypotheses regarding the determinates of insurgency 
success in the literature. The most prevalent is that a weak central state increases the 
likelihood of insurgency success. Fearon and Laitin discuss how weak states enable 
insurgencies to flourish.34  They argue that new states, poorly organized states, those that are 
                                                
34 Although Fearon and Laitin’s article outlines the factors leading to civil war, these same factors lead an 
insurgency to gain strength and challenge the state. 
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unstable at the center, and those that are physically disconnected from its populace are all 
hospitable environments for insurgency growth.35   
 Weak states can foster insurgency success in two ways.  First, they provide 
opportunities for an insurgency to build its domestic support base through their inability to 
counter military or political advances.  Insurgencies have a particular advantage when the 
state is unable to provide security and services to the population. In this case, they are able to 
act as a proto-state and, as the citizenry is dependent upon them for these basic needs, they 
attract supporters.36 Robb discusses groups that were able to provide services as extensive as 
health care and social activities for youth.37 The provision of such services also provides a 
veneer of legitimacy to the movement.  Second, weak states may be unable to defeat the 
insurgency in the event of a conflict.38 Although the state may still be stronger in terms of 
military strength than the insurgency, a lack of organization or commitment allows 
insurgencies to capitalize upon the opportunity for civil war and can enable them to succeed 
by taking over the government of the state. 
 HA1: A weak central state increases the probability of insurgency success.  
   The second alternative hypothesis is that the attractiveness of an insurgency’s goals is 
the primary cause for success. These goals are frequently connected to the identity of the 
group, and may be economic, political, or social in nature. For domestic supporters, the 
insurgency’s appeal may be based in its identity and pre-existing ethnic or socioeconomic 
ties.39 The identity and mission of the insurgency are crucial to success once again because 
                                                
35 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80. 
36 Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” 24, and Byman, “Understanding Proto-
Insurgencies.” 
37 Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and The End of Globalization, 147. His work here 
focuses upon terrorist groups (especially Hamas) but can be applied to insurgencies as well. 
38 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80. 
39 Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” (24) 
 26 
they increase the available support base. For example, Byman cites nationalism as a 
particularly important motivating cause for domestic supporters. 40 Not only do insurgencies 
win support from the public through their movement’s mission but they may also gain a safe 
haven, which many authors view as extremely important to avoid detection, and generate 
additional manpower.41 Individuals who sympathize with the aims of an insurgency may also 
provide other physical forms of support, such as money or materiel. The identity of an 
insurgency can also influence how external actors perceive its legitimacy and superiority as 
compared to the state. 42  
 HA2: When the insurgency’s economic, political or social goals represent the 
 interests of a sufficient part of the state’s population, the insurgency will be more 
 successful.    
  
The third hypothesis emphasizes the environment in which the insurgency operates. If 
the terrain is friendly to the movement’s capabilities and tacitics, they are more likely to 
succeed. If the terrain itself is mountainous or difficult, the insurgency usually has the 
advantage due to their use of guerilla warfare. Mountainous terrain prevents states from 
eradicating the insurgency by providing the rebels with better concealment.43 The insurgents 
may also be more familiar with the territory than the state.44 A second benefit of friendly 
terrain is the effect it can have upon insurgency-population relations. If there is a rural, 
isolated population base, the insurgency can exploit them for material needs such as food, as 
well as for soldiers or physical support without having to compete with the state.45 This 
                                                
40 Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 186. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics,16. 
43 Krause, “Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes,” 50. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 
Civil War,” 85. 
44 Ibid 
45 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80. 
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influence upon the population once again prevents the insurgency from being detected and 
allows them to grow, raising the probability of success. 
HA3: A terrain friendly to the insurgency’s capabilities increases the probability of 
success. 
 
 The fourth hypothesis states that success depends upon the external support an 
insurgency receives from other states. This support can come in the form of direct, material 
assistance, such as funding, provision of soldiers or arms, or the creation of an area of safe 
haven or less explicit support via diplomatic channels.46 This diplomatic backing ranges from 
a refusal to condemn the insurgency or its methods to direct conflict with the home state of 
the insurgency. Scholars note that in an increasingly globalized society, insurgencies struggle 
to be perceived by other states, not only neighboring ones, as a legitimate alternative to the 
government in power.47 This means that although state support can be of great assistance to 
the groups, it may also come with conditions for changes in tactics or the promise of a future 
partnership. In exchange for material support, which amplifies the resources available to the 
insurgency, the states may demand political concessions. 
HA4: State support, both material and diplomatic, provides resources and legitimacy 
which results in a higher probability of insurgency success. 
  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study evaluates the importance of material aid from three types of non-state 
actors.  To test the hypotheses I have presented, this research will examine two case studies 
in depth.  Studying the effects of third party aid to two insurgent groups will allow me to 
examine the strength of the movement prior to, during, and following the receipt of support.  
                                                
46 San Acka, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?" 598, and Byman, “Understanding 
Proto-Insurgencies,” 188. 
47 Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 16,18. 
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To isolate the effect of external aid, I choose cases with which I can hold constant 
other contributing factors, specifically those discussed in the alternative hypotheses section 
above. As such, the case studies allow me to investigate the difference in an insurgency’s 
size, territorial holdings, or other capabilities resulting from an injection of material support 
from non-state actors.  
This research focuses on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Both of these groups meet the 
definition of insurgency detailed above, as each waged a protracted battle against the state 
through the means of violence, with goals of gaining territory and reaching a political 
compromise or taking political control. 48  These case studies, in particular, are useful for 
answering the question of how different sources of material aid take effect because the 
variables identified in the extant literature as influencing insurgency success do not vary 
across the time frame studied.  
First, both insurgencies combated a moderately weak state during the entire period 
studied. Although in each case the state’s policy towards the insurgency fluctuated due to 
administration changes, the state’s strength did not change. In neither situation did the state’s 
growing weakness provide a window of opportunity for the insurgency to make gains.  
Second, the FARC’s initial Marxist goals had less initial appeal among Colombians 
than did the LTTE’s proposed creation of an ethnically separate state among the Tamil 
population. However, in the primary period of LTTE action, many Tamils grew tired of the 
insurgency’s goals, indicating that for both, the mission of the insurgency did not generate 
significant aid.  
                                                
48 CIA. Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency. 
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Third, both groups benefited from friendly terrain. The FARC made use of the 
difficult jungle and rural areas of Colombia, while the LTTE maintained a specific area based 
upon the Tamil ‘homeland,’ in which they could exploit the population due to community 
contacts and their isolation from state services.49  
Fourth, although the Indian government may have supported the LTTE in its 
formative years, this backing waned quickly and was not revitalized during the period in 
which the diaspora became the primary provider of aid.50  In the case of the FARC, other 
states were unwilling to support the insurgency’s efforts in any substantial way.  
Because these variables are be held constant across time, it can be assumed that any 
change in insurgency strength following the provision of external material aid should be 
considered a consequence of this assistance. As such, I will analyze capabilities prior to, 
during, and following the provision of support.  
The FARC received material support from two types of non-state actors: the narcotics 
trade and a terrorist group, the IRA. The insurgency’s strength will be measured in the early 
1980s, before its involvement with the drug trade, through the 1990s and again in the 2000s 
to determine the effect of aiding drug cultivation as well as entering the international trade. If 
narcotics funding allowed the insurgency to finance larger-scale attacks, supply more 
fighters, and hold more territory, as suggested by my hypothesis, these effects should be 
observable over this time. And should there be no change in tactics or growth resulting from 
narcotics income, material aid provided by these sources can be presumed to have a different 
effect—or lack thereof—than those suggested.  
                                                
49 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 413. 
50 Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s story, 132. 
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In addition, I will examine the FARC’s capabilities prior to and following their 
connection with the IRA in 2001. The hypothesis holds that after training with the IRA, the 
FARC would use new tactics against the state.   
I will scrutinize the capabilities of the LTTE before, during, and after the period over 
which the insurgency began to receive substantial assistance from the Tamil diaspora. I 
expect to see that the LTTE increased the scale of their attacks and saw an upsurge in popular 
approval after receiving this support. A decrease in the intensity of their efforts or a decline 
in domestic and international approval would imply that the influence of the diaspora is 
negligible.  
This analysis should reveal whether and how material support from a non-state actor 
enables an insurgency to increase their capabilities. An examination of the changes in these 
two case studies should prompt further questions about other insurgencies and the role of 
various non-state sources of material support. The next chapter begins this investigation with 
a discussion of the FARC. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA 
 
INTRODUCTION  
At the beginning of its long and bloody history, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) could boast little promise 
in becoming the greatest guerilla threat in the state, much less an internationally feared 
organization. The infamy of the group continues even now, despite a decrease in 
effectiveness in the past several years.  In February 2011, the FARC appeared in international 
news for their release of long-held hostages51 in addition to several other situations involving 
kidnapping and illegal crime. While most have seen these types of actions as indicators of the 
                                                
51 Jim Wyss. “Colombia’s FARC frees first of five hostages,” The Miami Herald, February 9, 2011. 
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FARC’s modern-day weakness, the government of Colombia is insistent that the organization 
renounce “terrorism, kidnapping, drug trafficking and extortion” before they conduct any 
further negotiations.52 The FARC remains a difficult and dangerous organization, despite 
fluctuations and the eventual decrease in their perception as a viable political alternative to 
state power. 
My analysis of the FARC will focus upon their interaction with two sources of 
support: the drug trade and a terrorist organization, Irish Republican Army or IRA. I argue 
that support provided by each influenced the insurgency’s capabilities differently, 
specifically that drug profits increased their overall scope while the IRA’s training increased 
their proficiency with different tactics. To examine the validity of these hypotheses I describe 
the nature of both actors’ support and evaluate the FARC’s strength over the periods in 
which the aid was provided. 
This chapter is composed of three main sections. First, I discuss the FARC and the 
drug trade and second, the FARC and the IRA. For each of the first two sections, I will, in 
sub-sections, 1) reiterate my hypotheses, 2) explain the history of the insurgency’s interaction 
with the narcotics trade and violent group respectively, and 3) analyze the results of these 
interactions. In the third main section, I synthesize the overall effect of this aid on the 
insurgency and conclude. 
 
THE FARC AND THE DRUG TRADE 
 Particularly in the last decade, rarely does the FARC appear in any news or academic 
article without condemnation of the insurgency’s participation in the growth and trading of 
narcotics. While this connection alone is concerning, the effect the profits have had upon the 
                                                
52 Ibid 
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growth of the FARC merits substantial analysis. In the coming subsections, I will test the 
hypothesis that material aid from narcotics trafficking, in the form of increased funding, 
implies greater scope as measured through gains in territory, combatants, and weapons.  
 After comparing the situation of the insurgency prior to and following the application 
of this support, the marked ways in which the FARC benefited from narcotics trafficking 
become evident. As proposed by the hypothesis, this increased income transformed the 
FARC into a truly formidable force against the Colombian state. To situate the reader and 
provide a full understanding of the insurgency’s progress with this particular support, I will 
begin with a brief history of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. 
 
Humble Origins 
 The FARC began as one of many groups resulting from an already extensive period 
of violence. The background of its formation stretches back even further than this time, 
known as La Violencia, to a classic liberal and conservative power struggle in the 1920s and 
30s. The major issue was land ownership and laws, which affected the rural peasantry’s 
ability to work and gain profits. This led groups of rural workers to organize in protest and in 
the hopes of protecting their access to their livelihoods. An additional consequence was the 
spread of leftist and communist ideology, which ran parallel to the demands for popular land 
ownership.53 These groups then solidified in the period of civil war, becoming more like 
guerilla groups willing to engage in violence against the elites and the state. According to 
                                                
53 Ricardo Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.” 
Transnational Institute, last updated June 1999 accessed March 6, 2011. 
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Hoehn and Weiss, “Guerilla violence has been a feature of Colombian life since civil war left 
tens of thousands dead in the late 1940s and early 1950s.”54   
Although the conflict was officially resolved through a power-sharing agreement that 
created the Frente Nacional (National Front), the continued exclusion of rural peasants 
allowed the guerilla groups to emerge even stronger than before. In addition to the FARC, 
the 1960s saw the official creation of groups such as the M-19, ELN, and EPL.55 In the case 
of the FARC, its two original leaders, Pedro Antonio Marin (also known as Manuel 
Marulanda or Tirofijo) and Jacobo Arenas, both fought as guerillas prior to their decision to 
found the FARC. Their decision that the concerns and ideology of the peasant bands could 
become a basis to gain actual political power led to the creation of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia in the rural area of Cauca in 1964. 56 Therefore, although much of the 
organization’s connection to their ideology appears to be lost in their later actions, the FARC 
was originally connected to the campesino (rural farmer) population at their inception.  
Authors examining the impact of U.S. drug policy on guerilla violence today are keen 
to remember these origins, separating the initial goals of the FARC from the actions they 
later took.57 In the spirit of representing the peasants, the FARC originally sought to expand 
their overall support base, probably so that they could also function in competition with other 
insurgent groups. Through the 1970s, they allied themselves further with the Communist 
                                                
54 Andrew Hoehn and Carlos Weiss, “Overview of Latin American Insurgencies,” In Latin American 
Insurgencies, ed. Georges Fauriol, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1985), 21. 
55 Vanda Felbab-Brown. Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, (Washington DC: Brookings 
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56 Alfredo Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerilla Group’s Long History,” NACLA Report on the 
Americas, Sep./Oct. 2000. 
57 Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, “The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of 
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party in Colombia and reached out to other peasant guerillas to amass notoriety and physical 
support.58 However, these efforts toward expansion were not as successful as hoped. It was at 
this point, in the close of the 1970s, when the FARC began to consider the drug trade. 
In the late 1970s—before establishing links with the drug trade—the FARC’s number 
of supporters remained small (in the hundreds) and the amount of territory they controlled 
and the scale of attacks they were able to conduct against the state were negligible.59  Their 
activities were funded primarily through extortion. As Felbab-Brown puts it, “the 1960s and 
early 1970s were years of survival for the FARC, not expansion.”60 Specifically, the low 
numbers of supporters and actual fighters meant that insurgency was unable to confront the 
government in any meaningful way and was confined to the deep jungles to avoid detection 
and eradication. However, other sources do note some increase through the 1970s, with 
increased hierarchical organization and achievements toward training and political 
planning.61 Despite gains, the first 15 years of the FARC’s history were clearly fledgling 
years, in which the insurgency struggled to find both direction and the means to achieve their 
goals. Geographically speaking, in 1979, the FARC had isolated control in eight departments 
(the Colombian equivalent of U.S. states.)62 A common indicator of strength found in the 
literature is that of ‘frentes’ or the number of active fronts through which the insurgency is 
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fighting the state. At the close of the 1970s, the FARC was (barely) organized into nine 
fronts.63  
 
The Drug Trade, early 1980s 
 The growth of coca had been fully introduced into rural areas of Colombia by the 
close of the 1970s, and the FARC in particular came into contact with drug production in the 
department of Caquetá.64 The profits gained by traders in comparison to the FARC’s 
previous means of financing (kidnapping and extortion, primarily) were noticeable, but 
ideologically speaking, the insurgency opposed drug production and dependency for several 
reasons. Coca was a double-edged sword. A great deal of money could be made, but the 
same reasons that made it so lucrative also made it unappealing for a Marxist group keen to 
avoid capitalist forces that would encourage the peasant base to focus upon making money.65 
However, coca and its cultivation had been conclusively introduced, and the FARC found 
itself cornered into a situation in which their opposition to the trade would erode their 
support base among the peasants, who feared the loss of their livelihoods. Driven by this 
threat of abandonment and the positive motivation of greater profit, the FARC officially 
reversed their stance on the drug economy in 1982.66 This decision was reflected by the 
conclusions of the organization’s Seventh National Conference, in which the FARC decided 
to focus upon building and reorganizing the frentes to address drug-producing departments, 
set up appropriate taxation, and fold in membership from lower level producers.67 
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When the FARC reversed this decision to participate in the narcotics trade, they 
secured for themselves a reputation not only as one of the longest-standing guerilla groups, 
but also one of the largest and most infamous. By gradually increasing their control over the 
trade, the FARC was able to finance the sort of attacks that would later force the Colombian 
state into peace negotiations and allow them to be a territorially widespread and powerful 
insurgency with a wide base of youthful, well-trained supporters and various fronts. While 
the FARC may have reluctantly entered the trade, their commitment to it essentially defined 
their later capabilities and ensured a great deal of their success.  
By the early 1980s, corresponding with the entrance into the drug trade, the 
insurgency boasted roughly 2,000 to 3,000 fighters.68 In 1983, the FARC enjoyed high levels 
of popular ideological support—in the mid-1980s, the guerilla group was seen as a more 
viable political solution—but nowhere near the sort of strength in numbers it would have in 
the 1990s.  
 
Expanding Role in the Drug Trade, 1985-2000 
 The arrival of coca to Colombia should be seen as a monumental event for the 
FARC’s history. This drug in particular is of use to an insurgency given its relative ease to 
harvest and transport without detection. It also has high monetary value on the global market 
due to its illegality and enhanced, in this period, by early US drug eradication policies, 
particularly in Latin America.69 The FARC began their foray into this relative goldmine 
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through taxation or ‘gramaje.’ In keeping with their goals of representing and supporting the 
rural peasant class, the insurgency expanded into the coca trade in ways that also allowed 
them to be seen as a protecting force. Their first move was to invoke a ‘revolutionary tax’ of 
15 percent on the coca farmers.70 By collecting this sort of ‘rent’ upon the landholding 
farmers, the FARC could still be seen as a middleman between the traffickers and the 
cocaleros (coca workers), while establishing close links and dependency of the traffickers 
themselves. Through the 1980s, this tax would gradually replace revenue gained from 
kidnapping or extortion as the primary means of funding. 
 However, the insurgency quickly made the transition into other forms of investment 
as well. Not only could they tax, but also charge for the use of airstrips on their land (and 
trafficking through their land in general), and levy taxes on refinement of coca product. To 
further increase profits, the FARC built more airstrips and factories for coca paste on their 
expanding territory.71 Soon, the FARC encouraged and controlled coca cultivation itself on 
their territory, moving into the actual growing stage of the drug. In part, the timing of this 
transition was a result of the collapse of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, which allowed 
the FARC to truly take over the coca industry. As stated by Labrousse and Garcés, “Over 
time, the FARC has revealed an undeniable tendency to increasingly implicate themselves in 
activities linked to drug trafficking and not to be content with simply collecting taxes at 
different levels of production and traffic.”72  The transition to growing coca on their lands 
and processing the paste in FARC-owned factories occurred by the early 1990s,73 after which 
the FARC expanded even further to taxation of other drugs such as heroin and opium, even 
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moving their fronts to control poppy fields.74 The insurgents’ final domestic step was to 
eliminate the middlemen of drug trafficking groups, known as the chichipatos, to control 
even this last money earning area in 1998 to 1999.75  
 
Developments Post-2000 
 The precise role taken by the FARC in the international narcotics trade at the 
beginning of the new millennium is somewhat speculative. Some authors draw upon 
statements made by the DEA in 2001, in which they assert that the FARC does not have any 
known connections in the United States or Europe—essentially, outside of Latin America. 76 
However, this does not mean that the insurgency cannot benefit directly from links with 
individuals or cartels outside of Colombia. Several accounts note the connection between the 
FARC and a Brazilian drug lord before his arrest in 2001, which also apparently gave the 
FARC access to a substantial shipment of weapons.77 Without a doubt, the insurgency has 
been increasingly involved in the multiple steps and levels of the trade, and as a result has 
cooperated more extensively in the last decade with the paramilitaries and drug cartels 
themselves to gain income on the exportation of drugs. With this increased codependence, 
however, has come an even more noticeable drift away from their original mission of 
representing the rural poor. As such, despite an increase in income78 the sort of political 
capital gained in the early years of simple taxation has diminished as the leadership 
concentrates on appeasing its business partners rather than its initial peasant supporters. 
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Benefits: Income, Territory, and Military Capacity 
 In this section, I will test the hypothesis that such widespread involvement with the 
production and trade of drugs has allowed the FARC a distinctive increase in scope. The 
insurgency’s history with drugs is extensive, easily encompassing a greater window of time 
than many insurgencies’ total years of existence. However, the greatest change in the scope 
of the insurgency resulting from this investment occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. During 
these decades, the benefits of drug money can be seen specifically in three ways: first, a 
larger number of active supporters and fronts; second, an ability to hold more territory; and 
finally in the number and intensity of their attacks, each of which will be discussed in this 
section. 
Overall, the most apparent benefit of the drug trade for the FARC was the huge 
increase in income.  Even in the earlier years of the 1980s, the insurgency was gaining 
roughly $3.8 million per month ($45.6 million per year), which increased to between $60 and 
$100 million with the added investments in the 1990s.79  While the monetary increase is 
important, ultimately the benefits to an insurgency such as the FARC should reveal 
themselves in gains in capabilities. The primary indicator given throughout literature about 
the FARC is the size of the organization, provided in overall numbers and the number of 
fronts or geographical divisions of fighters. An early estimate for 1986 already shows an 
increase with 3,600 members organized into 32 fronts.80 However, less than a decade later, 
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these 32 fronts had jumped to 60, while the number of active supporters doubled to 7,000.81 
Some authors have attributed the jump in participation in the 1990s to the collapse of 
paramilitary organizations funded by drug cartels, which led the FARC to absorb middlemen 
and traffickers, as most were willing to simply change employers and continue in the same 
‘career.’82 Otherwise, the increased notoriety and territorial control of the insurgency also 
brought in other youths and individuals to the struggle or, more accurately, to an organization 
that could afford to feed them. In total, Metelits says: “The FARC’s involvement in the coca-
producing and trafficking industry facilitated a huge growth in its forces… to more than 
18,000 by 2001.”83 These individuals were organized into seventy frentes, implying that the 
strength of each fighting front also increased dramatically.84 
 The second indication of increased strength is the greater amount of territory the 
FARC was able to control and exploit for their purposes. This progression was gradual, but 
on the whole drastic, just as was the case with the available supporters. In the mid 1980s, the 
FARC could boast control of more than 13 percent of the country’s total in 173 
municipalities.  By 1998, this figure had risen to 622 municipalities, which meant that the 
FARC could operate across 40 to 60 percent of the Colombian state.85 The amount of 
territory held was both affected by and affected the coca trade, as gaining more land in 
certain departments allowed for more coca cultivation, or easier routes for exportation in 
others. Another consequence of controlling such vast amounts of territory was the cultivation 
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of political capital via the peasants working on the land. Cocaleros in areas under their 
control could boast protection from unfair wages and growing practices, as well as from the 
aerial eradication and counter-narcotics operations undertaken by the Colombian state. The 
latter protection was important in that it led peasants to actively support the FARC’s actions, 
although not the insurgency’s ideology, in the form of political protest.86 In addition, the 
FARC was sometimes able to use the funds created by the drug industry to provide 
infrastructure such as schools or hospitals.87 Therefore, not only did the number of active 
guerillas increase, but recognition of the organization as a main vehicle for anti-state 
resistance did, as well. This type of popular support should be distinguished from the popular 
approval generated by a diaspora because it resulted from the FARC’s control of the 
territory, rather than encouraged approval of the insurgency itself. 
 Finally, the insurgency’s involvement in the narcotics industry allowed for an 
impressive increase in military prowess. At the most basic level, the FARC was able to move 
from hiding in the jungle to 600 clashes with the Colombian state in the 1990s and more than 
2000 by the year 2002.88 The attacks against the state were widespread and effective as 
compared to the survival techniques resorted to prior to the 1980s. The simple control of 
territory certainly had an effect on the waging of battles, as the insurgency was able to 
choose whether or not to defend a stronghold, depending upon its level of coca production, 
rather than consistently flee.  Another important benefit of the narcotics trade was the 
connections created with other illicit activities such as arms trading, and the provision of the 
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means to participate in them. With drug profits, the FARC was able to arm its guerillas with 
large numbers of upgraded versions of their former weapons. Rather than the antiquated 
rifles used in the first 15 years of its existence, the organization could now purchase machine 
guns, assault rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, and explosives, among other types.89 The 
distinct advantage given by drug profits and advances is particularly evident when analyzed 
across departments. Those which contained fronts with the heaviest coca producers, Caquetá 
and Putumayo, were able to account for the greatest overall military advances against the 
Colombian state in the mid 1990s, even as they continued to provide monetary support to 
other fronts.90 A final, but crucially important factor is the overall confidence the 
improvements via the drug trade gave the insurgency. The Colombian state, through many 
administrations, attempted different peace negotiations with little success. According to 
Labrousse and Garcés, “Their economic power, which is also the source of their military 
potential, undoubtedly contributes to their obduracy during peace negotiations with the 
government.”91 Thus, the development of the FARC from a small band of outlaws to a full 
fledged, state-acknowledged threat, therefore, can largely be seen as a result of the drug 
trade.  
 
OTHER VIOLENT, NON-STATE GROUP INTERACTION 
 The 2001 capture and later trial of three IRA members in Colombia produced 
international aftershocks of attention. At the time, it was almost inconceivable that two 
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groups previously confined to action in the area or state they wished to affect would aspire to 
cooperate. The second section of this chapter will explain the influence of this cooperation: 
training received from a violent non-state group, here, a terrorist group. It will test the 
hypothesis that material support—training in particular—from another armed group will 
increase the insurgency’s capability to use new tactics, generating greater attention from the 
state. 
 An investigation of the aftermath of this training reveals precisely how the FARC, by 
collaborating with the IRA, was able to learn the practice of urban terrorism and greatly 
expand their use of explosives in particular. These new capabilities made the FARC much 
more deadly to both the Colombian army and, in certain circumstances, civilians. This ability 
to access completely new tactics did alter the perception of the FARC as a newly dangerous, 
violent organization.  
 It should be noted that at the time of this interaction, the FARC was also still profiting 
from the drug trade. Funds obtained from this source probably paid for the IRA cooperatives’ 
stay in Colombia- though this is not discussed in the literature and only speculated upon in 
news sources. Despite this speculated interaction between the two forms of aid, the effects of 
the collaboration with each type of source are distinct. As seen in the previous section, 
support in the form of drug funding increased the insurgency’s territory, number of fronts, 
and military capacity in guerilla warfare with the state. Drug funding did not increase the 
capability of the FARC to employ a new, distinct form of violent confrontation. 
  The effects of the IRA training, as will be demonstrated in this section, are less broad 
sweeping. The new tactics and explosives experience gained did not result in an increase in 
number of troops, nor did they increase their capacity to engage in guerilla warfare. Such 
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training did create the possibility of operating in an urban environment—something entirely 
inaccessible prior to this cooperation—but through isolated terrorist attacks rather than 
seizing territory or moving the guerilla struggle into the cities. These specific results occurred 
only immediately following the recorded interaction between the two violent groups.  As 
such, aid provided from each of the two sources can be clearly distinguished and analyzed 
separately despite that both were benefiting the FARC at the same time.  
 
New Connections: IRA Support 
 As the FARC expanded into the global market with its drug production, the 
insurgency also appears to have looked for other international connections. The insurgency 
was still searching for additional ways to threaten the Colombian state, beyond the armed 
clashes resulting from the materials purchased through the drug trade. In the close of the 
1990s, the FARC could still be firmly defined as a rural guerilla force, making use of 
conventional weapons and operating out of the jungles and farmland strongholds. Although 
the insurgency might risk being seen as less legitimate if they engaged in more violent acts, 
the FARC had already been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States in 
1997, and their criminal actions of kidnapping, extortion, and the drug trade increased this 
infamous reputation. The FARC had been hoping to move into urban warfare since its initial 
brush with drug profits, and its leadership was now able to plan to do so by cooperating with 
another internationally recognized terrorist group: the IRA or Irish Republican Army. 
 Naturally, little is known about the lead-up to this cooperation, as the involvement 
became known only following the arrest of three known IRA activists (one later to be 
revealed as a Sinn Fein representative) on Colombian soil. On August 11, 2001, Jim 
Monaghan, Niall Connolly and Martin McCauley were arrested while trying to leave 
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Colombia, traveling with false passports. 92 Later, it was determined that they had traces of 
explosives on their clothing and luggage, and although the men claimed to be observing and 
assisting with the Colombian-armed groups peace process, it was soon believed that their 
actual role was most likely something more sinister.93 A former FARC guerilla solidified the 
accusations by identifying the men and asserting that they had, indeed, been working 
alongside the FARC in the demilitarized zone.94 They were eventually indicted in 2002 in 
Colombia on formal charges of training the FARC to use explosives and traveling on false 
passports.95 The possible connections between the two organizations were not in themselves 
alarming, as there is speculation that the IRA (and possibly other violent groups such as the 
Basque ETA) was in communication with the FARC since roughly 1998.96 Indeed, some 
reports list that at least five and possibly up to 15 IRA members had been to the FARC 
demilitarized zone in the years in which the three men who were arrested had conduced their 
visit.97 Although formal indictments were issued and the men were convicted in their trials, 
they managed to flee Colombia and most likely return to Ireland, prior to serving their 17-
year sentences.98 Though the exact terms of an ‘exchange’ between the two groups are 
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uncertain, the FARC was clearly hoping to gain access to new types of weapons and tactics, 
while the IRA appears to have been promised a substantial sum of money in return for their 
educational service.99  
 
Benefits of IRA Training: New Tactics, New, Distinct Technology 
 The changes in FARC capabilities through 2001 and 2002 were unmistakable. Just 
following the arrest of the three men, the Colombian authorities were concerned with the 
implications of the involvement in urban areas in particular. One report from just after their 
capture states that the FARC rebels received training in ‘Semtex,’ a particular kind of 
explosive, and that this development would allow them to better attack cities through terrorist 
attacks rather than confining themselves to armed military conflict.100 The first observed 
change was the use of a gas attack against a police station, which was an entirely new tactic 
for the FARC but not necessarily known as one used by IRA.101 The Commander in Chief of 
Colombia’s armed forces (General Tapias) made a statement suggesting that this new kind of 
attack may reflect the IRA training but it was not necessarily the culprit. However, in the 
coming year, more and more reports surfaced regarding the FARC’s new capabilities. In one 
report in April of 2002, an explosive killed 32 police members while they were attempting to 
enter a FARC stronghold.102 The most audacious act, however, was the detonation of 
explosives in the military school and presidential palace in 2002’s August inauguration of 
President Uribe. A first round of explosives went off hours before the inauguration, causing 
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injury but mostly serving as a distractor for the later round of mortars, which killed 20 
civilians and injured 60 others.103 Following this attack, a Colombian general (Reynaldo 
Castellanos) and a British bomb authority both noted the similarity to previous IRA actions 
(in the way the bombs were detonated), while other advances such as the type of mortars 
used and the remote control detonation were also far above the capabilities of the FARC just 
months before. Previously, any explosives composed by the FARC were seen as primitive, 
but in this instance only 4 of the 16 mortars used actually detonated and the attack was still 
remarkably disruptive and deadly. 
Later, in summing up the changes in the FARC’s tactics, U.S. sources would note the 
FARC’s frequent use of this type of diversionary tactic, which had been seen as an IRA 
specialty. Through the use of either similar long-range explosives or car bombs, the FARC 
began to frequently use secondary devices to attack individuals responding to the first ones. 
This served as a way to isolate and eliminate security forces and, in particular, bomb 
experts,104 a tactic that had been used frequently in the IRA’s most violent years.105 
Given the status of one of the individuals arrested in this terrorism connection, early 
reports speculated about the sort of technological or weapons diversification the FARC 
would take advantage of as well. James Monaghan earned himself the nickname of ‘Mortar 
Monaghan’ by working as a specialist with the explosives for the IRA. According to one 
article, he supposedly developed the specific type of mortar used by the IRA, which had a 
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much more specific targeting ability.106 In another article written about a year later, the 
authors state that Colombian authorities noticed this increase in accuracy in the mortars the 
FARC had begun using.107 The improvements in weaponry the FARC was now able to use, 
explosives in particular, were not limited only to mortars. According to Juan Forero, 
“Colombian military officials here have blamed the I.R.A. for having greatly improved the 
rebel group's bomb-making and the accuracy of its rockets. In recent months car bombs have 
killed scores, and bomb detonation experts have lost their lives trying to disarm intricately 
fabricated booby traps.”108 This article even downplays the number of deaths allotted to 
bomb detonation, which other authors described as 10 percent of the state’s bomb experts 
killed by car bombs in the 18 months following IRA involvement.109 In other figures, in the 
same 18 months, 400 army officials110 were killed through FARC attacks and 19 police 
officers in one department alone.111 
 Overall, there was a definite increase in the FARC’s ability to engage in urban 
warfare, as the possibility was previously nonexistent. This was a result of both tactical 
developments and, more importantly, the ability to use explosives accurately and efficiently. 
Most articles use the term ‘urban terrorism,’ implying a completely different type of violence 
than rural guerilla attacks and citing the IRA training as its cause. While the primary targets 
were still police and army officials, some authors have speculated that the move into urban 
terrorism was an effort to scare the city population into supporting greater concessions to the 
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FARC in the 2002 presidential term.112 In addition to civilian casualties, the explosives have 
affected infrastructure and democratic institutions, as the FARC has managed to take out 
“bridges, power lines, reservoirs, and other facilities” while killing the same police and 
officials that help to preserve Colombian democracy.113 As clarification that this new, more 
lethal FARC was a result of IRA training, neither United States investigators nor the 
Colombian officials were able seize upon any another explanation for the new tactics. The 
benefits of the IRA training continued to be evident even until 2005, when Colombia’s armed 
forces chief discussed the use of IRA-like grenades even in smaller towns in the southwest of 
the state.114 
 Perhaps unfortunately for the FARC, the arrest of these IRA activists came just a 
month before the September 11 attacks. The United States had already been paying greater 
attention to the FARC as it became the provider of 90 percent of the US’s cocaine and 70 
percent of the heroin,115 but now, as it was proven to have international links to terrorist 
organizations, one proven and others speculated, the FARC was suddenly seen as a possible 
real threat. As a result of decisions from both within Colombia and from the United States, 
engaging the FARC in negotiation was limited after the election of President Uribe in 2002. 
The move into urban terrorism as a scare tactic did have the effect of generating increased 
attention, but unfortunately also resulted in a military crackdown rather than concessions. 
Assisted by the United States, Uribe was able to substantially strengthen the Colombian 
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military, but the FARC continued as a strong and violent presence for several more years in 
particular.116 
 
CONCLUSIONS         
 The FARC has experienced significant transitions over its now 47-year history. What 
began as but one of many peasant movements countering a repressive and acquisitive state 
lingers today as a violent, criminal organization. The new millennium has been a time of 
international infamy for the FARC, despite its considerable weakness by the close of the 
decade. Colombia’s growing military strength and state capacity during this time, particularly 
as a result of U.S. input via Plan Colombia, have isolated the FARC from many of its active 
supporters gained in the 1990s and helped to make the original aims of the organization 
appear obsolete. However, the insurgency’s choices to seek funding through the lucrative 
drug trade and to reach out to other criminal organizations are part of what have allowed it to 
continue as a threat to the state.    In 1982, the FARC’s leadership accepted that 
participation in the new drug economy would not only ensure its survival but also allow it to 
finance the type of opposition it had been hoping for since its inception. The money earned 
from drugs, first through taxation, then use of FARC lands and airstrips, and finally from 
coca production and refinement itself was an impressive improvement from what could be 
earned through limited kidnappings and business extortion. With this money the FARC could 
both promise a sort of livelihood to young idealists, drug traffickers and cocaleros and appear 
as a valid, powerful force. This change is clearly represented in the vast increase in numbers 
of combatants and numbers of bands or ‘frentes’ the FARC could sustain. The increase in 
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support was also cyclical, allowing them to take more land and produce more coca—and 
eventually poppies for heroin—which increased their geographical presence substantially as 
well. Finally, by providing both connections and financial backing, the drug trade enabled the 
FARC to upgrade the weapons used by the insurgency and adequately supply its forces. This 
threefold increase in numbers, territory, and weapons allowed the insurgency to combat the 
Colombian state in multiple armed clashes. This new potency meant that by the 1990s, each 
administration tried in some way to negotiate with the FARC and to offer various 
concessions such as the demilitarized zone. As Felbab-Brown puts it: “Before it (the FARC) 
began to participate in the cultivation of coca and the production of cocaine, the group was 
small and largely powerless; following its embrace of drugs, it emerged as a dangerous 
challenger to the Colombian state.”117  
  
With drugs, the FARC became a challenger. However, it was still a challenger in a 
specific, isolated way, as it practiced almost entirely rural guerilla warfare. The insurgency 
now had the funding in place to expand their strategy, and chose to do so by reaching out to 
the IRA (though many speculate that the IRA was not the only terrorist organization in 
cahoots with the FARC at this time). The influence of three explosive specialists on FARC 
tactics and capabilities was unmistakable even within 18 months of the experts’ arrest. While 
the insurgency had largely failed to use explosives before, they were now able to 
manufacture and use mortars and car bombs accurately. They also clearly learned specific 
tactics for using these explosives such as radio detonation and the diversionary approach 
mentioned. Overall, collaboration with another violent group allowed the FARC to 
participate effectively for the first time in urban terrorism, which certainly gained them both 
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Colombian and international attention. It was around this time that the FARC was perceived 
as most violent and dangerous, even as it was no longer popularly viewed as an alternative to 
the Colombian state. 
Several discrepancies with the original hypotheses regarding the drug trade should be 
discussed. First, an increase in state concessions was predicted as a result of the IRA 
involvement, but the increase in scope from the drug trade actually had a more positive result 
for the insurgency. The move into urban terrorism certainly sparked attention, but had the 
negative consequence of more focused military attention, rather than the sort of concessions 
seen through these administrations’ attempts to negotiate. An additional, unforeseen 
consequence of the drug trade was the use of narcotics funds to provide services such as new 
hospitals to domestic populations. However, these efforts to present themselves as the 
peasants’ allies did not result in approval of the insurgency itself, but rather support and 
appreciation of the income generated by coca production, which was protected by the FARC 
at the time. 
The FARC, therefore, provides an excellent case study to illustrate of the effects of 
material support in the forms of both funding from narcotics and training from other violent 
groups. As suggested in my first hypothesis, becoming narcotics producers and traders 
certainly increased the overall scope of the FARC, arguably turning it into an actual, credible 
insurgency. Training from the IRA provided the FARC with an entirely new urban 
battleground, which I suggested in my third hypothesis that involvement with a non-state 
violent group provides an insurgency new tactics. However, an additional and unforeseen 
consequence of this collaboration was the strong military onslaught on the FARC motivated 
by both domestic and international attention. After examining the insurgency’s path and 
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strength over the last half-century in Colombia, it becomes clear that these two forms of 
external, non-state material aid were distinct in shaping the FARC’s greatly increased 
capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 During a recent lecture, Dr. Pushpa Iyer118 had to remind herself to refer to the LTTE 
as a failed insurgency. Although the Sri Lankan army successfully destroyed the insurgency 
and killed its leader in 2009, their long-standing presence in the northeast of the country had 
seemed permanent. Upon their decimation in May of 2009, war between the LTTE and the 
state had claimed over 90,000 lives and left thousands of others wounded or displaced.119  As 
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late as August of 2010, up to 6,000 of those who fled the country, especially from high-
conflict Tamil areas, have yet to return.120 Internationally, the LTTE or Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam were recognized as one of the world’s most violent and potent armed groups 
(designated as a terrorist organization in many states, including the U.S.). Although the Sri 
Lankan conflict itself attracted little international commitment apart from an effort toward 
peace mediation in the start of the last decade (2000, 2001), LTTE’s cohesive, leadership-
centered structure and their capacity to carry out attacks- frequently through the use of 
suicide terrorism-generated interest and fear. Until very close to its demise, the LTTE was a 
strong insurgency still seen as an alternative to the Sri Lankan state by some Tamils and even 
more so by the Tamil diaspora. Now, diaspora communities are the only possibility for any 
Tiger resurgence, a concern that illustrates both their international breadth and former 
capacity to provide for the LTTE. 121  
 In this chapter I discuss the diaspora as a source of material aid, specifically funding 
and propaganda, for the LTTE. I posit that fundraising increased the scale of their attacks on 
the Sri Lankan state. In addition, the provision and spread of propaganda increased public 
approval both within Sri Lanka and in the diaspora’s host countries. To test the results of this 
hypothesis, I monitor the LTTE’s actions and strength through the 1990s, during which they 
experienced both substantial growth and important increases in capability. 
 This chapter has three main sections. The first details the history of the Sri Lankan 
conflict, providing background information for the period discussed in my hypothesis. The 
second examines the Tamil diaspora, with sub-sections that address 1) the characteristics of 
the diaspora communities, 2) the methods of fundraising employed and their usefulness, 3) 
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the benefits of diaspora monetary assistance, 4) the benefits of disseminating propaganda, 
and 5) the influence the Tamil diaspora has upon the LTTE in turn. The final section reviews 
and analyzes the ways substantial diaspora support affected the capabilties of the LTTE. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY: THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT UNTIL 1990 
 The Sri Lankan conflict, like the violence in Colombia, was prolonged and complex. 
While the FARC’s peasant roots led to their formation and leftist ideology, the Tamil 
ethnicity and its historical role in Sri Lanka form the basis of the LTTE’s purpose. Sri Lanka 
itself, known as Ceylon until 1972,122 was a British colony until 1948, but the armed conflict 
between ethnic Tamils based in the north and northeast and the majority Sinhalese began 
largely after independence. Tamils are predominantly Hindu, while the Sinhalese are 
Buddhist.123 As the state developed through the 20th century, Tamils pursued higher-level 
jobs requiring education and frequently took places of authority even in the non-Tamil 
capitol, while the Sinhalese south capitalized on greater agricultural resources and thus 
provided related employment. 
 The election of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1956 sparked a change in Sri 
Lankan politics. This party was built on a pro-Sinhalese/Buddhist platform, opposed to 
western ideas and somewhat resentful of the positions of public office Tamils had previously 
held.124 Naturally, this created tension with Tamil communities who were concerned about 
the level of oppression under the new government. The push for a separate state based in the 
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north and northeast territories of Sri Lanka developed over the next decade, emerging as an 
organized movement in the 1970s.125 The LTTE began as the Tamil Student’s Federation but 
changed its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—Tamil Eelam meaning separate 
Tamil state—in 1975.126  At its onset, the group based their demands for a separate state on 
Marxist ideology, but redefined them after realizing that a mission grounded in Tamil 
ethnicity would have a broader support base.127 From the start, their leader, Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, maintained strictly centralized control and was held in extremely high regard 
by the insurgency itself. The LTTE and the Sri Lankan separatist movement continued to 
grow in the 1970s, with Tamil political parties uniting under the Tamil United Liberation 
Front in 1976.   
 Alongside political processes, the LTTE and other, similar Tamil groups began to use 
violence to promote their aims. Their attacks were small in scale through the 1970s, focusing 
on police who were gathering intelligence against the LTTE and eventually on ethnic 
Sinhalese and others in these police forces.128 The number of casualties escalated and an 
attack on Sinhalese soldiers in 1983 triggered massive rioting, after which the northeast of 
Sri Lanka was thrown into civil war as Tamil student movements joined the militant efforts 
and the Sri Lankan government attempted to suppress them with violence in turn.129 This 
civil war marked the beginning of the prolonged Tamil exodus from the area and led to the 
widespread diasporas in western countries and neighboring India. India itself aided the Sri 
Lankan government from 1987 to 1990 by sending troops to occupy the Tamil areas of the 
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country.130 These peacekeeping forces were unable to elicit any substantial compromise from 
the LTTE and when they left the area in 1990, the guerilla army claimed complete control of 
the northeast and the Jaffna peninsula. 
 
THE DIASPORA: RAISING FUNDS, DISTRIBUTING PROPAGANDA  
 Although the LTTE was able to initiate violence in Sri Lanka prior to the formation 
and exploitation of Tamil diaspora131 communities, the massive influx of funds from these 
sources has undoubtedly been important for the insurgency’s capability to oppose the state. 
In the case of the LTTE, the extent of the diaspora was such that it was at times the main 
force keeping the insurgency alive. My hypothesis for the effect this essential aid had on the 
LTTE is that the material support—financial backing—from the diaspora resulted in greater 
scale attacks against the state. However, the diaspora may exercise some control over the 
nature of these attacks. I hypothesize that an additional function of the diaspora is to 
disseminate pro-insurgency propaganda, which increases popular approval. 
 For the LTTE, the most notable effects of diaspora support were stronger, more 
offensive attacks, by which I mean that they occurred at a greater frequency and allowed the 
insurgency to boast of more victories against the state through a variety of campaigns already 
in use by the Tigers. I evaluate the effect of the diaspora support over the period from 1990 
to 2001, noting the diaspora’s decision to decrease funding after September 11, 2001. I will 
also analyze the function of the diaspora in creating a more favorable perception of the LTTE 
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internationally and within Tamil communities. In the next section, however, I present a 
description of the Tamil diaspora to illustrate its particular effectiveness. 
  
Scope of the Tamil Diaspora  
Perhaps one of the most noticeable characteristics of the LTTE is the extent of its 
international support in the form of the diaspora of ethnic Tamils.132 The exodus began in the 
early to mid-1980s, when there was widespread violence against Tamil families as a reaction 
to the formation of Tamil separatist groups, in cities such as Colombo and Jaffna in 
particular. More affluent families resettled in western countries, taking advantage of more 
liberal asylum laws, while some fled to the Tamil Nadu area of India.133 Although the 
diaspora is global in scale, Canada and the United Kingdom boast particularly large 
populations of Tamil immigrants in addition to organizations (the British Tamil Organization 
or UTO and the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils) created specifically to 
promote ethnic unity and advertise the Tamil cause.134  These large, highly organized groups 
begin at the community level, where they solicit participation based upon their common 
ethnic and cultural heritage. Cultural events and holidays serve the double purpose of 
physically uniting the community and spreading news about the progression of battles and 
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efforts within Sri Lanka.135 Because the vast majority of the Tamil diaspora are, in fact, 
refugees, these communities maintain a strong distrust of the Sri Lankan government and 
army due to family casualties and the terror of the civil war, and therefore passionately 
support the separatist cause as a viable solution to Tamil woes.  
 Numerical estimates of the size of the diaspora are varied. Estimates in the past ten 
years range from 450,000 to one million but tend to fall closer to 7-800,000.136 In 2001, the 
UN estimate for the global diaspora was 817,000.137 This number can be broken down into 
roughly 350,000 in Canada, 300,000 in the United Kingdom and 150,000 in India, with other 
states making up the remainder. 138 Overall, the growing size and scope of the Tamil diaspora 
provided a substantial, sympathetic population from which the LTTE could elicit material aid 
in their fight for a separate Tamil state.  
 
Fundraising Strength 
 The LTTE benefited greatly from the steady income provided through taxation of 
Tamil families abroad, donations, and business agreements with the various diaspora 
communities. Unlike other insurgencies, who may pull upon diaspora funding as a 
supplemental income, the LTTE gained a substantial part of their funds to sustain everyday 
operations and essential purchases from their fellow Tamils living abroad. As the amount of 
individuals living in diaspora increased, these communities were increasingly seen as a 
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source of steady income through various fundraising efforts undertaken by the international 
branches of the LTTE.  In general, it seems that funds were appropriated through three 
methods: 1) direct taxation or donations from the community, 2) through front groups acting 
as NGOs or charitable organizations, and 3) through the use of legally owned businesses 
which both provided a share of their profits and frequently provided an avenue for weapons 
purchasing and shipping.139 
 LTTE international members living and operating in different states were able to 
access funding directly from the diasporas. Main hotspots for diaspora funding existed in 
Canada and the United Kingdom or Western Europe, and the United States to some extent 
prior to the LTTE’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist organization in 1997. Though some of 
the donations are voluntary, part of the steady flow of money follows the structure of taxation 
by the insurgency that many families were accustomed to prior to their departure from Sri 
Lanka. 140 This basic level fundraising can be leveraged in a monthly fee per family or in the 
form of a fee based upon a certain amount per individual.141 In addition to these, LTTE 
operatives demanded increased giving on days of importance for the separatist struggle such 
as their Martyr’s Day. While some families certainly gave to the cause willingly, others were 
reminded of the situation of family members still living in LTTE controlled areas, and that 
their safety required a certain level of fiscal participation.142 In some cases, LTTE structures 
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offered protection from deportation or other penalties in the migrants’ new home countries, 
and levered this as a threat for giving.143 Wealthier donors provided additional funding, while 
overall donations fluctuated with the military success of the insurgency: increasing with 
battlefield successes and decreasing to encourage negotiations with the Sri Lankan army.144 
The total scope of direct fundraising from the diaspora was extremely important for the 
LTTE, and contributed particularly to the procurement of arms.145 
 The foundation of various organizations or agencies with the stated purpose of Tamil 
aid allowed the LTTE a very effective additional fundraising source. The Tamil Relief 
Organization or TRO was a particularly capable example of pulling in additional funding and 
accessing Tamil populations on a global scale.146  Though the organization did provide 
humanitarian relief to local populations, thus boosting their image and support in Sri Lanka, a 
part of the money was also used for the purchase of arms and better technology. By 
presenting this mission of providing relief or infrastructure development through other 
organizations, the insurgency is ultimately able to access funds from other NGOs, 
individuals, and occasionally even host government grants. 147 Particularly in the early 1990s, 
these umbrella organizations gained a high level of interest by presenting abuses from the Sri 
Lankan state against the Tamil population. However, in the late 1990s and particularly 
following 2001, funding from LTTE related groups was increasingly difficult to generate due 
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to national laws preventing fund raising for an organization now designated as a terrorist 
group.148 
 A third mechanism for fundraising involved the creation and use of Tamil-oriented 
businesses and industries. One method was for the LTTE—or more likely one of the 
aforementioned umbrella or front groups—to provide the start-up capital for a local, 
community level business and later split the profits with its actual, registered owners.149 This 
not only provides additional funding, but also gives a community based connection for the 
international wing to communicate with other Tamils. A second strategy was the creation of 
international-level businesses largely investing in Tamil cultural products such as music and 
movies to be marketed to the diaspora.150 While these businesses generated less income than 
other diaspora fund raising, they also created a legal front with which to pursue illegal 
connections to arms purchases and shipping. 
 These three sources generate a significant portion of the Tigers’ financial means. 
Some references make mention of even greater exploitation of the Tamil diaspora through 
harsher methods such as charging for relocation of Tamil migrants.151 One suggested total 
was that about $60 million USD yearly of the $100 million total budget came from the 
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diaspora and external network, but other figures imply a much higher total budget.152 The 
majority of these funds are used for arms procurement while the remainder keeps the basic 
functions and events of the insurgency functioning.153 This high percentage illustrates the 
vital nature of the diaspora for the LTTE’s survival. Several sources comment that 
dependence upon this international network only increased with time, particularly following 
losses of territory such as the commercial area of Jaffna in 1995.154 The importance of the 
diaspora’s financial support was also demonstrated by the concern expressed by the Sri 
Lankan government to other governments, seeking their aid in limiting diaspora funding in 
whatever way possible. In addition, when the United Kingdom declared the LTTE to be a 
terrorist organization in 2001, it was forecasted to be a “financial blow,” indicating that the 
new preventions against fundraising would greatly limit the LTTE’s capacity to purchase 
arms in particular.155 Through the 1990s, it became increasingly evident that, as Daniel 
Byman and his coauthors’ text stated, there was “little doubt that without this economic 
backing, the group’s ability to continue with the Tamil Eelam struggle would be significantly 
reduced.”156 Despite this source’s support of the importance of the diaspora for the LTTE 
insurgency, the authors do not fully explain how the capabilities of the LTTE were 
augmented, which I discuss in the next section. 
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Fundraising Benefits: Arms, Troops, and Increased Attacks  
 While the benefits of the diaspora’s engagement with the LTTE were important, their 
effect upon the insurgency itself is subtler than the massive and marked growth in scope of 
the FARC as a result of drug profits. One explanation for this phenomenon is that the 
extremely centralized control around the leader of the insurgency and the secrecy he 
promoted about the functioning of the LTTE may be the cause of relatively low levels of 
information about the insurgency itself. However, the insurgency’s strength escalated 
primarily in the 1990s through an increased acquisition of weapons and capacity to maintain 
troops, which was used to engage in more aggressive confrontations, and encourage the 
growing perception of the insurgency as a true threat to the Sri Lankan state. The next several 
paragraphs discuss how these three developments enabled the LTTE to challenge the Sri 
Lankan state by increasing the scale of their attacks. 
 The most directly observable benefits of the diaspora funding are the weapons 
attained with it. As discussed in the previous section, a substantial portion of the funds 
provided for Tamil aid were actually allocated to the purchase of weapons from international 
sources.157 However, this capacity increased through the 1990s as the international fronts of 
the LTTE learned how best to organize and draw funds from the diaspora. Immediately 
following the Indian peacekeeping force’s departure from Sri Lanka, in 1988 and 1989 the 
LTTE essentially armed themselves through raids on the Sri Lankan army forces, which 
limited them to small arms.158  After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold 
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war, the LTTE had amassed enough funding to benefit from the newly reinforced black 
market for weapons. In 1994, they were able to attain a large shipment of explosives.159 In 
the late 1990s, the LTTE made a push to increase their capacity by expanding their naval and 
aerial capabilities.160 The year 2000, before the events of 9/11 sharply increased attention to 
the global arms trade and violent groups, the insurgency invested heavily in howitzers, 
mortars and small arms.161  
 The different nature of each of these purchases implies that the ample budget afforded 
an increase in arms for a variety of offensive campaigns. The LTTE is unusual in that its 
increasing offense against the state entailed a number of campaigns, including terrorism, 
naval, and aerial capabilities alongside guerilla warfare. The secrecy of the insurgency’s 
internal dealings prevents full understanding of how so many campaigns against the state 
were possible for the LTTE. However, as these efforts were developed in the insurgency’s 
formative years, they should not be seen as new, distinct tactics brought in as the conflict 
progressed. 
 Further budget increases allowed the LTTE to fund a vastly increased number of 
fighters, ranging from guerillas to their elite cadre of suicide bombers.162 One figure for the 
maintenance of the growing number of troops—10,000 to 14,000 cadres of according to one 
source, though information is scarce for much of the 1990s—was a required $7 million 
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annually.163 By actually allocating some of the money destined for Tamil relief to 
infrastructure development and family aid, the LTTE solicited tolerance from the local 
communities and thus preserved their original havens and their recruitment bases.  Many 
Tamils abroad also reaffirmed their commitment to Tamil Eelam and the Tigers, and 
encouraged this approval when writing or sending money home, which served as an 
additional boost to these efforts.164 
Through both the money gained and the networking capacity of such an international 
organization, the LTTE was able to develop from a small, poorly prepared fighting force of 
students to an insurgency that could directly engage with the Sri Lankan armed forces. The 
guerilla roots of the LTTE meant that it continued to make use of the jungle areas as a retreat 
and base when faced by losses of urban areas like that of Jaffna in 1995, and they continued 
to use lower-risk strategies such as the assassination of political leaders. However, a high 
number of both recruits and new weapons meant that the LTTE could expand their 
opposition in a number of ways, such as an unconventional navy, which was an effective 
counterweight against the actual Sri Lankan naval force.165  Through the 1990s, the LTTE 
instigated several strong offensives against army holdings and bases, leading to heavier 
military casualties and an increase of territory in some instances.166 In the late 1990s, the 
insurgency amped up their signature use of terrorism, specifically in the capital city of 
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Colombo, with attacks on oil complexes outside of the city in 1995, the Central Bank in 
1996, the World Trade Centre in 1997, and a large-scale attack on the airport in 2001.167 The 
combination of naval attacks, stronger guerilla action against the armed forces, and terrorism 
implies a growing ability to take the offensive and frequently emerge victorious against the 
Sri Lankan forces and government. Guaratna in particular is clear that the funding and 
networking benefits from the diaspora were crucial in moving the LTTE’s struggle beyond 
perpetual small-arms battles in the jungle. He writes, “Economic support by the Tamil 
diaspora and migrant communities has enabled the LTTE to pursue a more direct and high-
intensity campaign against the Sri Lankan state security forces.” 168 
 
Spreading Propaganda: an Additional Benefit  
 Though the diaspora’s primary supporting function was their financial investment in 
the LTTE, they also served an important diplomatic and propaganda-spreading role. 
Particularly in the earlier years of the insurgency, these refugee community members were 
the primary Tamil voice, able to influence other, newly arrived Tamils, potential donors, and 
politicians or diplomats in their new homes. These communities made use of the oppressive 
image of the Sri Lankan forces in the conflict of the 1980s and the uncompromising 
administration of the early 1990s to drum up additional sympathy and legitimize the struggle 
for a Tamil state.169  The Eelam Political Administration, another LTTE international body, 
created a tailored, three part vision of the conflict used to promote the Tamil cause: that the 
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Tamils had been victimized, that an independent state was the only way to ensure their 
safety, and that the LTTE was the means by which to achieve this independence.170 
Propaganda efforts included basic distribution of flyers and information, community events 
and marches, and directly lobbying government officials.171 This direct lobbying proved 
effective, particularly in states with large Tamil populations, as politicians were afraid of 
losing the community vote if they took a hard stance on the LTTE.  The states with large, 
active diasporas (such as Canada and the UK) took legal steps against the LTTE and LTTE 
fundraising much later.172 
 The active diaspora also helped to generate support within previously untapped Tamil 
diaspora communities and from Tamils in Sri Lanka itself. This encouragement of domestic 
popular approval helped preserve the LTTE’s community presence. Propaganda became 
highly technical, using easily accessible websites, emails, and social networking to keep the 
international community abreast of developments in the conflict and create the atmosphere of 
a worldwide effort.173 
 These online sources made it easier for diaspora members to continue the function of 
urging LTTE approval from those in Sri Lanka, as well.174 Essentially, in addition to a 
greatly increased budget, the diaspora formed the foundations of a global network that both 
drummed up popular approval abroad and encouraged the Tamil population in the midst of 
the struggle to continue tolerating the presence and actions of the insurgency. 
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Tradeoffs? Diaspora Influence on the LTTE  
 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the world’s attention turned to limiting 
terrorist and illegal action. This, of course, affected the LTTE as it came under increased 
scrutiny from the United States, who originally listed it as a terrorist group in 1997, and the 
United Kingdom, where it gained this distinction for the first time. Overall, 2001 signaled a 
strong downturn in the insurgency’s perception and created additional setbacks as arms 
became more difficult and expensive to procure. Both as a result of newly enforced 
limitations and the diasporas’ unwillingness to support the now clearly-labeled terrorist 
organization, funding began to wane. Practices like suicide bombing and recruitment of child 
soldiers garnered increased attention as the conflict continued, but this failed to limit diaspora 
funding until close to the new millennium.175 Though in 2001 Sri Lanka elected a more 
conciliatory government, many authors cite the waning diaspora support as a primary catalyst 
for the ceasefire the insurgency declared that December. This was accomplished both 
through a decrease in funding and the diaspora’s insistence that the LTTE consider political 
avenues toward independence or even autonomy—specifically the peace talks offered by 
Colombo at this time.176 This change to a political approach, which followed a period of 
considerable military success, can be seen as an indicator of the diaspora’s influence and the 
importance of their support but does not fully correspond with my initial hypothesis.  
 My hypothesis proposed that the diaspora would be able to influence decisions 
regarding targets or strategies pursued by the LTTE. The Tamil diaspora does not appear to 
have expected or exercised this level of control. It was only due to mounting international 
pressure and a reassessment of the LTTE’s overall image that the diaspora began to withhold 
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funds, and frequently only after limitations were imposed by the host state. By doing so, they 
did encourage the insurgency to choose a temporary ceasefire, as the capability to attack the 
state was strongly dependent upon the diaspora’s funding. Because there was no change seen 
in the LTTE’s chosen targets or even practices in violation of human rights norms, my 
proposition that aid would result in a sort of policing role for the diaspora was not upheld by 
the case of the LTTE. The undeniable control exercised by the insurgency’s leader may 
account for this lack of external influence, but this question requires further study to explain 
the degree of involvement the Tamil diaspora had upon the conflict itself. It is undeniable, 
however, that united action such as withholding funds from the diaspora was a significant 
threat, and that the insurgency relied heavily upon their support. 
The diaspora’s impact remains notable even following the LTTE’s dissolution in 
2009. Although the insurgency itself was entirely crushed by the Sri Lankan army and their 
leader, Prabhakaran, had been killed, sources warned about the danger of the diaspora 
reawakening the civil war. One news article advised countries with substantial Tamil 
populations to closely monitor fundraising and community activity in an effort to “ensure 
that their territories will not be used to reignite LTTE’s failed but extraordinarily bloody 
terrorism.” 177 This ongoing consideration highlights the dependency of the LTTE upon their 
global network and its importance in turn throughout the insurgency’s history.178 
CONCLUSIONS 
                                                
177 “Lessons From Sri Lanka,” The Washington Times, June 22, 2009, accessed March 17, 2011,  
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/22/lessons-from-sri-lanka/. 
178 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” 
146-147. As Fair says, “the LTTE was from its inception thoroughly rooted to the diaspora and its various 
institutions and therefore dependent upon the structure afforded by the diaspora for revenue raising, public 
diplomacy, perception management and so forth.” 
 72 
 Though the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is now a failed insurgency, its bloody 
memory lingers in the minds of conflict analysts and, of course, the Tamil people. Over its 
26-year history as an armed insurgency, the LTTE grew from a small band of committed 
Tamil fighters to “a monstrous and mammoth entity that could rival the Al Qaeda if it wanted 
to.”179 As presented in this chapter, the ethnic Tamil diaspora, expelled from Sri Lanka as 
refugees in the mid-1980s, generated much of the support that made this increase in fighting 
capability possible. The diaspora generates both funds and propaganda for the LTTE. These 
funds, which may have reached into the $100 million per year range, were used to purchase 
more or more technologically advanced arms, increase the size of the various fighting units, 
and use an array of strategies, gaining an overall ‘offensive’ position. In accordance with my 
hypothesis, these developments allowed the LTTE to truly engage the state on a number of 
battlefields. In addition, by disseminating propaganda, the diaspora presented the LTTE as a 
viable opponent rather than a terrorist group in their host states, both delaying legal actions 
against the insurgency and encouraging popular approval from all Tamil families. As 
hypothesized, the diaspora did increase this approval, which included a lack of condemnation 
by several key Western states, by providing and circulating positive propaganda. The 
importance of the diaspora was such that it became the backbone of the insurgency’s 
prowess, providing a majority of their funding and fulfilling an even larger supportive role by 
naturally forming a global structure.  
 It was essential enough to change the insurgency’s course of action when such aid 
was revoked, but did not have the ability to make choices about targets or offensives, or to 
limit the conflict for humane concerns. This may have been based upon Prabhakaran’s 
complete control of the insurgency’s actions, or an unwillingness of the diaspora to support 
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any reforms in a unified or substantial manner. The question of insurgency setbacks due to 
diaspora input should be further studied, as the hypothesis presented in this thesis was not 
supported by the case study of the LTTE. Additionally, due to the lack of information about 
the operations of the insurgency itself, it is difficult to identify an explanation for how the 
LTTE formed naval and aerial branches, though they were clearly supported financially by 
the diaspora and originated nearly alongside the LTTE itself as some of its first efforts 
against the state. Despite these limitations, the importance of the Tamil diaspora in increasing 
capabilities such as the scale of attacks against the state and the level of popular approval is 
undeniable. The Tamil diaspora provided the support to form the LTTE into a veritable 
monster of an insurgency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 74 
 
 Though many assert that the FARC no longer poses a threat to Colombia, the 
insurgency is not entirely eradicated: they continue to take hostages and exert control over 
parts of the Colombian state. Though it has proved more persistent than most, the terrible 
longevity of insurgencies is only exacerbated by access to a source of material aid. In the 
FARC’s case, this source has evidently been the drug trade. Other insurgencies endeavor to 
access different, sustainable connections to material support, which merits a thorough 
investigation into non-state sources.  This thesis began that investigation in the hopes that it 
will be continued in the future. 
This chapter has four sections. First, I assess the contribution this thesis has made to 
the extant literature. Second, I analyze the case studies and synthesize the results, noting the 
successes and failures of each hypothesis and further limitations of the research. Third, I 
make suggestions for policymakers to face the challenge of insurgency conflict based upon 
the results of this analysis. Finally, I suggest future investigation on the topic of material non-
state aid and conclude. 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
 In the second chapter, I presented three hypotheses about the role of certain sources 
of material support on an insurgency’s capabilities. First, narcotics trafficking should provide 
an insurgency with increased income, thereby affording them the possibility to expand the 
scope of the insurgency in several ways, such as the number of fighters or weapons. Second, 
diaspora support in the form of funding will result in an intensified campaign against the 
state, though diasporas may then attempt to influence decisions regarding targets or strategies 
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of attack. Diasporas can also be expected to encourage popular approval by circulating 
propaganda. Finally, training received from a fellow non-state armed group will allow an 
insurgency to add new, distinct tactics and constitute a greater threat, resulting in state 
attention or concessions. By testing each hypothesis, this thesis advanced the research on 
third party aid to insurgencies and served as a catalyst for future investigation.  
The use of case studies to test each hypothesis has revealed much about how types of 
non-state actors assist insurgencies. By holding constant other variables that affect 
insurgency success, I have isolated the positive or negative effects of third-party aid upon an 
insurgency’s capabilities and capacity to rival the state. The analysis of these effects 
increases our understanding of several key factors: 1) the role of key non-state entities; 
namely the drug trade, diasporas, and other non-state violent groups in affecting insurgency 
capabilities, 2) the types of aid they provide; namely greater income, funding and 
propaganda, and training or distinct weapons, and 3) how the aid provided by these actors is 
applied by an insurgency to increase its capabilities.  
The next section summarizes these three types of findings for the case studies of the 
FARC and the LTTE. 
 
THE CASE STUDIES 
 To study the results of involvement with the narcotics trade and another violent 
group—here, a terrorist group—I assessed the FARC’s strength over two periods. The first, 
from 1982 to 2000, reflects the main period of benefit derived from the drug trade. The 
second, from 2001 onward, demonstrates changes in the insurgency’s actions after support 
from the IRA. Investment in the drug trade and collaboration with a non-state armed group 
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were analyzed separately, because they mainly occurred over different years and provided 
distinct types of material aid. As expected, the evident discrepancy between the two types of 
benefits created for the insurgency suggest that the FARC pursued distinct sources of support 
to combat the state in separate ways.  
 The insurgency’s role in the drug trade facilitated several important increases: in their 
income, territory, number of combatants, and military prowess. The first increase reflects the 
primary type of support available through the drug trade: an enormous amount of funds, 
particularly when compared to the budget prior to the 1982 decision to tax coca 
production.180 The FARC more than quadrupled its income over the first two decades of its 
participation in the trade, jumping from $45 million per year in the early 1980s to over $200 
million per year at the close of the 20th century.181 While these impressive figures are 
important, they alone have no consequence upon the insurgency’s interaction with the state. 
However, the increase in troops, territory and weaponry afforded by the funding certainly 
did. Both the total number of active supporters or guerilla fighters and the number of fighting 
fronts the FARC could financially support grew remarkably. The number of FARC fighters 
expanded from about 3,000 in the mid-1980s to 18,000 by 2001.182 This six-fold increase 
created an army capable of matching the Colombian state’s and furthered the legitimacy of 
the organization. The territory seized for these forces to occupy grew in a similar manner 
over these years of newfound income. The process of territorial gain proceeded somewhat 
more rapidly, with the insurgency controlling nearly half of the country’s land in the final 
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years of the 1980s.183 In this situation, drug resources created a circular effect, 
simultaneously pulling in peasants’ property for cultivation and taxing the products of this 
land to afford the forcible capture of other territory. A final, but notable consequence of this 
lucrative source of support was the access to and purchase of large quantities of weapons and 
more sophisticated technologies. Individually, each of these observable effects of the 
monetary support provided by the narcotics trade would still have been a significant boon for 
the FARC. However, as proposed by my hypothesis, the combination of these improvements 
meant that the scope of the FARC impressively increased. The group grew markedly in terms 
of people and territory, and allocated these new resources to emerge as a military force that 
could truly counter the Colombian state. As expected, in the case of the FARC, funding from 
the drug trade produced a striking metamorphosis from a struggling band of guerillas to a 
threatening goliath of a fighting force. 
 The effects upon the FARC’s capabilities resulting from their collaboration with the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 2001 were less grandiose or far ranging. Instead, the training 
received provided specific innovations for what had become a capable insurgency employing 
a guerilla strategy. Unlike the gradual buildup of territory, troops, and military capability 
afforded by the drug trade, changes in the insurgency’s capabilities were evident almost 
immediately following their explosives training with IRA operatives. In the year after they 
received this support from the IRA, the FARC’s operations changed in one basic, but 
influential way: they could now engage in urban terrorism via the use of mortars—a 
previously inaccessible weapon due to their lack of training. Though the group was already 
notorious throughout Colombia and abroad, this new technical and tactical capability 
provided the chance to affect the lives of Colombia’s urban population and wreak havoc 
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upon the Colombian police force. Though the immediate effect of IRA support was as 
predicted, the second part of my hypothesis is less conclusive. Urban crusades brought the 
FARC heightened media attention and increased state wariness, but did not result in any 
notable concessions. Instead, greater concessions such as the demilitarized zone were seen 
for the FARC through several administrations as a result of increased scope due to narcotics 
funding.  Certainly, following IRA training, the FARC was at its most threatening to 
Colombia and its citizens, but it was precisely this threat and strength that prompted greater 
U.S. aid and a more severe Colombian military response. Hence, the way support from a 
non-state armed group manifested itself was as predicted, but the eventual result for the 
FARC’s success was, if anything, negative rather than positive. 
 A comparison of the first part of the FARC case with that of the LTTE demonstrates 
that the effects of diaspora funding resemble those of money obtained through the drug trade. 
Similar to the FARC, the LTTE was hardly a threat to the Sri Lankan state before it laid 
claim to the wages of Tamils fleeing from the conflict into Western countries. The 
insurgency, as expected, used their new level of income from tapping into this source to 
increase troop levels and their variety and amount of weapons, using each as a necessary 
component to increasing the scale of their attacks. However, unlike the FARC, the LTTE 
expanded their strength through a variety of offensive fronts against the state by relying on 
the support of the diaspora. The LTTE was perhaps the only insurgency to boast both a naval 
branch and an elite group of suicide bombers early in its progress,184 made possible by the 
rapid increase of diaspora funding. Once diaspora support became a common occurrence for 
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the insurgency, they launched a full offensive campaign against Colombo, moving out of the 
jungles and onto the battlefield and even cities through terrorism.  
 An additional, evident benefit to the LTTE was the diaspora’s creation and 
dissemination of pro-Tamil propaganda among the Tamil communities abroad, in Sri Lanka 
and to the governments of their new home states. Through community events, websites, 
lobbying, and basic forms of communication with other Tamils, this support contributed 
directly and indirectly to the amount of funds given and the approval of the insurgency. 
Notably, states with the largest active diasporas were also those willing to tolerate their fund 
raising and delay legal condemnation of the LTTE—the United Kingdom and Canada, for 
example. As such, the diaspora’s advertising did have the effect of enhancing popular 
approval by increasing its own size and encouraging Tamil solidarity within Sri Lanka. 
However, delayed international condemnation of LTTE umbrella organizations was possibly 
a more important result, as it helped maintain the global fundraising structure. This was not 
anticipated by my hypothesis, but should be recognized as an important factor that prolonged 
the LTTE’s existence and increased its overall capabilities through popular approval. 
 The final component of my hypothesis regarding diaspora aid suggests that the 
diaspora itself may exercise some control over the choice of targets. Though I concluded that 
the Tamil diaspora encouraged the LTTE’s decision to sign a ceasefire by withholding funds, 
it appears that the diaspora had little to no awareness, much less control, of the group’s 
tactics and basic administration. Perhaps in an insurgency with a more open structure, this 
level of diaspora involvement would imply greater awareness and involvement in choosing 
targets or methods. In this situation, however, it should still be noted that the diaspora, when 
largely united in its choice to reduce funding, was able to influence the LTTE—primarily due 
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to their concern over international perception following 9/11 rather than the group’s specific 
choices of tactics.  
 Several limitations to these findings should be discussed. It can certainly be stated 
that increased support via the types of material aid studied results in increased capabilities for 
the insurgency. This thesis cannot, however, assert that source of support has a causal role 
upon insurgency success. None of the sources generated a conclusive, distinct success in the 
case studies, although each of the three—narcotics funding, diaspora funding, and IRA 
training—led to noticeably improved capabilities. In some ways, these sets of capabilities are 
easily distinguishable from each other. For example, the popular approval generated in the 
diaspora’s host countries is clearly not present in the case of the FARC. The effects of drug 
funding and diaspora funding are less easy to differentiate, suggesting that each increases the 
insurgency’s capabilities in a similar way. However, the element of diaspora approval led the 
LTTE to funnel these capabilities into battlefield victories, while the FARC increased the 
scope and presence of the insurgency itself. These limitations suggest that while different 
sources of non-state material aid may not predict different courses insurgency success, they 
do influence the increase in capabilities such as scope, tactics, and popular approval that 
should be expected. 
 
RETHINKING POLICIES DEALING WITH EXTERNAL AID 
 The study of outside support for internal conflicts such as those driven by 
insurgencies has particularly interesting policy implications. Support from such actors adds a 
third component into dyadic conflicts frequently isolated to include just the insurgency and 
state. As seen in the above analysis of case studies, the provision of material support can 
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have a significant effect on the capabilities of an insurgency. Therefore, the findings of this 
thesis should have significant implications for policymakers as they seek to end conflicts. 
According to Daniel Byman and his co-authors, “Focusing specifically on outside support for 
insurgencies may prove particularly promising, as it offers a means through which 
policymakers can influence an insurgency’s progress without direct intervention in the 
country in question.”185 
 First, the conclusions of each case study imply that policymakers should consider and 
carefully analyze the sources an insurgency taps for material aid. As interaction with all three 
types helped the insurgencies to expand and oppose the state in different ways, governments 
of host states and external states interested in the conflict would be wise to consider both the 
sources of external aid at the insurgency’s disposal and the goals the insurgency may have 
for increasing its capabilities. For example, the LTTE made careful use of the diaspora, a 
resource available to them through ethnic connections and shared experiences in the early 
years of the civil war, for the dual purpose assessed in the previous section. In this case, the 
leadership recognized the potential to gather funds and disseminate information. They 
therefore crafted international branches to manage and exploit their source in this manner.186 
But in the case of IRA support of the FARC, it is likely that the FARC specifically sought 
assistance from a terrorist group to advance their struggle into urban environments, and the 
IRA was able to fulfill this need. This implies that policymakers must have an awareness of 
both readily available supporters and the battlefield or conflict goals of the insurgency. 
 From the results of the narcotics trade and diaspora analysis, this thesis can confirm 
that money is a crucial tool for any type of insurgency growth, and that access to the 
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narcotics trade is the most lucrative endeavor available. The total intake of diaspora funding 
was less extreme, but undeniably important. Policy suggestions for limiting access to these 
immensely helpful sources are complicated. Put simply, any participation with the drug 
economy, regardless of the current size of the group, should be promptly halted, despite the 
difficulty in doing so. States with significant diaspora populations connected to an 
insurgency should cooperate with the insurgency’s home state to limit or ban fundraising. 
They should also take pains to monitor connected organizations that appear to be NGOs and 
note business trends within the community. Of course, these suggestions could also be 
applied with the intention of encouraging or aiding an insurgency if desired, or possibly used 
to assess a group’s strength. For example, policymakers in neighboring states in particular 
might monitor these channels of contribution to gauge its effect on insurgency capabilities 
when deciding the best side to back in a conflict. 
 Overall, the notable effects created by each source indicate that policymakers have 
the opportunity to affect conflicts away from the battlefield by paying attention to non-state 
providers of material aid. Breaking down such support structures is rarely considered as a 
primary choice for dealing with insurgencies, possibly because non-state aid is seen as 
largely irrelevant. The striking increases in capability resulting from these three source types 
should serve well to combat this oversight. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 In the introductory chapter of my thesis, I noted that the many factors of  insurgencies 
indicate that those studying them should never want for work. Providers of support to 
insurgencies are equally engaging. Substantial gaps remain in the scholarship on types of 
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actors, types of support, and the interaction between domestic and international support. This 
thesis prompts questions related to several of these gaps. 
 Perhaps the most obvious extension of this topic is increasing the amount of case 
studies or data used, thereby giving it a more global scope. Limited case studies were useful 
in my research to examine how the insurgencies converted aid into important capabilities. 
However, the topic should also be approached using data sets and statistical analysis or a 
much larger set of case studies to generate a more global, thorough understanding of non-
state aid. Additional research will also have to take the alternative hypotheses listed in the 
second chapter into account. Ideally, future studies should include cases with diverse 
qualities to better define how different non-state providers of material aid lead to different 
increases in capability. 
 It would also be interesting to hypothesize in a similar way about the results of new 
sources’ involvement- such as that of refugees, NGOs, or other criminal trades like the arms 
trade. Do all actors shape insurgency capacity in unique ways? In addition, states should be 
reassessed in relation to non-state providers to serve as a comparison and offer an updated 
vision of the interactions each have with insurgencies. 
 A third direction for new research would be to change various factors to alter the 
focus of the research. For example, one might pursue the topic as it relates to 
counterinsurgency rather than to understanding the insurgencies themselves. To start, some 
of the policy suggestions made in the previous section could be further analyzed with case 
studies to gauge their effectiveness. Better research on state responses to insurgency receipt 
of material aid would tie the discussion of external support to the domestic situation. This 
could also be accomplished by comparing the effects of different sources of domestic support 
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on insurgencies. Finally, instances in which material support is accompanied by diplomatic, 
passive or indirect support should be better understood to understand if each form of support 
continues to increase insurgency capabilities. 
 Finally, the question of diaspora influence provides an interesting possibility for 
future study. The case of the LTTE demonstrated that any diaspora authority over the 
insurgency’s choices does not necessarily accompany diaspora funding. However, the Tamil 
diaspora did affect one major decision—that of the ceasefire. This discrepancy between 
major and minor choices should be better understood, as should the role of diaspora funding 
on other insurgencies functioning under different circumstances. 
 To conclude, my thesis has but grazed the surface of investigation into non-state 
material support for insurgencies. Based upon my findings, I assert that the type of source 
from which an insurgency obtains material support does matter; as the narcotics trade 
involvement, diaspora, and violent non-state group assessed each produced a distinguishable 
increase in capabilities for the insurgency in question. This alone has important policy 
implications for ending or alleviating insurgency-state conflict, but further analysis is 
necessary for a complete understanding of non-state aid. Bearing in mind the horrific 
consequences for civilians caught in the throes of such conflicts, this thesis has endeavored to 
investigate and encourage additional research on the role of non-state material support. 
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